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Independent Regulatory Review Commission

September 30, 2019

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL (antitrust@attornevgeneral.gov)

Office of Attorney General, Antitrust Section Attn: Tracy W. Wertz, Esquire Strawberry Square, 14th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17120

> Re: Comments to Notice of Proposed Rulemaking #59-10 (Unfair Market Trade Practices)

Dear Ms. Wertz:

This letter is submitted on behalf of Chesapeake Energy Corporation ("Chesapeake") and its affiliate companies.

Chesapeake is an energy company focused on discovering and developing unconventional oil and natural gas assets in the United States. Chesapeake is one of the largest producers of natural gas in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. It has field offices in Sayre and Harrisburg and employs more than 115 persons in the Commonwealth. Chesapeake purchased the mineral interests underlying more than half a million acres of land in Pennsylvania from which it produced an average of 137,000 boe of natural gas per day in 2018—enough to power 8.8 million homes per day. Since 2011, Chesapeake has paid more than \$135 million in impact fees to local Pennsylvania communities and state agencies. Those fees have been used to fund road improvements, emergency preparedness, environmental protection, social services, records management and tax reduction. Chesapeake is a proud investor in Pennsylvania and looks forward to continuing to responsibly develop natural gas resources.

Chesapeake appreciates the opportunity to submit the following comments to the Office of Attorney General's "Unfair Market Trade Practices; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking" which was published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin on August 31, 2019.

GENERAL COMMENTS

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking omits important context that bears on the legitimacy and validity of the proposed regulations. As you know, there are currently pending before the Supreme Court two petitions for allowance of appeal from the Commonwealth Court decision interpreting the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL"), 73 P.S. § 201-1 et seq., which forms a partial basis for the proposed rulemaking. See Anadarko Petroleum

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Corp. v. Commonwealth, 206 A.3d 51 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019), petition for allowance of appeal filed (Pa. Apr. 15, 2019) (No. 226 MAL 2019) (hereinafter referred to as "the Pending Litigation").

The Attorney General commenced the Pending Litigation after the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted preliminary approval to settle a federal class action arising out of dispute over calculation of royalties on the sale of natural gas extracted from the class members' property. See Demchak Partners Ltd. P'ship, et al. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., et al., No. 3:13-cv-2289-MEM (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2015), ECF No. 91. The Office of Attorney General objected to the class action settlement in federal court on the same day the Office initiated the Pending Litigation in Bradford County on behalf of the same landowners and with respect to the same mineral lease agreements and royalty payments.

The Pending Litigation represents the first time that the Attorney General sought to utilize the UTPCPL to pursue claims against purchasers and the first time that the UTPCPL was used to prosecute alleged antitrust violations. Chesapeake and the other defendants filed preliminary objections challenging the Attorney General's novel attempt to pursue remedies against purchasers as well as antitrust remedies through use of the UTPCPL. The Honorable Kenneth D. Brown, who was specially assigned to preside over the matter in Bradford County, denied the preliminary objections but characterized the statutory interpretation questions as "close and extremely difficult" and "a significant interpretative issue" and, as a result, sua sponte certified the issues for immediate appeal to the Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court affirmed in a decision which was adopted by only four of seven judges and was the subject of a sharply worded dissent. Importantly, the Commonwealth Court decision is not yet final. Chesapeake and the other named defendants filed petitions for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court seeking review of the very same statutory interpretation issues that the Attorney General is proposing to "codify" through the proposed rulemaking. Specifically, Chesapeake is asking the Supreme Court to consider, inter alia: (1) whether the General Assembly intended the UTPCPL-a statute created specifically to protect consumers-to also provide a right of action on behalf of sellers against consumers; (2) whether the UTPCPL can be used to pursue alleged antitrust violations when the General Assembly declined to enact a state antitrust statute. The petitions for allowance of appeal are fully briefed and remain pending before the Supreme Court.

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking references the Commonwealth Court's decision in the Pending Litigation but fails to acknowledge the potential for review and reversal by the Supreme Court. Because the Commonwealth Court decision is not yet final, it is premature for the Attorney General to seek to "codify" that decision through proposed rulemaking. For this reason alone, consideration of new regulations purporting to interpret the UTPCPL should be deferred until appellate review is concluded.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS

Chesapeake offers the following comments to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking:

I. The Proposed Rulemaking Represents an Unconstitutional Effort to Bypass the General Assembly.

In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Office of Attorney General devises a new term—"unfair market trade practices"—and opines that such practices constitute "unfair methods of competition or deceptive trade practices" which are prohibited by the UTPCPL. See Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.2. The Attorney General defines "unfair market trade practices" to include various "contracts, combinations or conspiracies" in restraint of trade, see Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.2 (definition of "unfair market trade practices," sub-sections (i)-(vi)), and actual, attempted and joint monopolization, (id. at sub-sections (vii)-(x))—the same conduct prohibited by the federal antitrust laws.¹ The Attorney General's attempt to delegate to himself the authority to bring antitrust claims under the UTPCPL is invalid for at least two reasons.

First, the Attorney General can exercise only those powers conferred by the General Assembly and the General Assembly has deliberately declined to enact a state antitrust statute. The Office of Attorney General is a constitutional office. The Constitution directs that the Attorney General "shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be imposed by law." Pa. Const. Art. 4, § 4.1. Those powers are "strictly a matter of legislative designation and enumeration" and consequently "legislation enacted by the General Assembly is the exclusive source of the powers and duties of the elected Attorney General pursuant to Article IV, Section 4.1." Commonwealth v. Carsia, 517 A.2d 956, 958 (Pa. 1986) (citation omitted). While the Commonwealth Attorneys Act authorizes the Attorney General to "represent the Commonwealth and its citizens in any action brought for violation of the antitrust laws of the United States and the Commonwealth," 71 P.S. § 732-204(c), Pennsylvania has no state antitrust statute. The General Assembly considered antitrust legislation at least 25 times since the UTPCPL was enacted in 1968 but each time failed to pass a state antitrust law. See Failed Antitrust Bills (attached). Through the proposed rulemaking, the Attorney General is attempting to create state liability for antitrust violations and at the same time confer upon himself the power to prosecute those claims. This violates Article 4, $\S 4.1.^2$

Second, the Attorney General's proposal to regulate "unfair market trade practices" conflicts with the grant of authority in the UTPCPL and the intent of the General Assembly in enacting the UTPCPL. The statute was designed and intended to protect *consumers* against

¹ Section 1 of the Sherman Act states in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations...." 15 U.S.C. § 2.

² As demonstrated in the Comparison Chart attached as Exhibit A, the Attorney General's proposed definition of "unfair market trade practices" parrots various provisions from the antitrust bills rejected by the General Assembly.

unfair or deceptive business practices by *sellers*.³ By contrast, antitrust laws protect competition.⁴ The proposed regulations are thus inconsistent with the legislative intent underlying the UTPCPL and are not necessary for enforcement or administration of the statute. Moreover, as noted above, the General Assembly considered and rejected proposed legislation that would have prohibited the same restraints on trade and monopolization that the Attorney General proposes to regulate through rulemaking. *See* Comparison Chart attached as Exhibit "A." Antitrust enforcement is not within the purview of the UTPCPL and therefore the proposed rulemaking exceeds the authority conferred by 72 P.S. § 201-3.1. Further, the Attorney General is wrong in positing that the Commonwealth Court in the Pending Litigation endorsed his effort to create state antitrust liability through rulemaking. *See* Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at pp.2, 4. That issue was not before the Commonwealth Court. In any event, the Attorney General cannot confer upon himself through rulemaking the very authority which the General Assembly refused to enact by statute.⁵

⁴ See, e.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342-43 (1990) ("The antitrust laws were enacted for the protection of competition") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

⁵ The Attorney General is urged to correct a central misstatement in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking concerning "a public hearing" on one of the failed state antitrust bills. The Notice asserts that legislators and commentators advocated at and after the public hearing on SB 848 in the 2013-14 session that a state antitrust statute "would be redundant to the act [*i.e.* UTPCPL]" and that the Office of Attorney General should instead "use" the UTPCPL to prosecute antitrust claims. *See* Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at p.2. This assertion is inaccurate. There was no reference to the UTPCPL at the June 25, 2013 hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee. (A copy of the transcript is attached as Exhibit "B.") To the contrary, the transcript reflects the speakers' views that a state antitrust statute was unnecessary because *federal* antitrust remedies were available to the Attorney General. (*See, e.g.*, Tr. at pp. 27, 45, 46, 52, 69, 73.) This is also true today. There is no need for the Attorney General's substantial rewrite of the UTPCPL because *federal* antitrust remedies remain available through an action under *federal* antitrust law. Indeed, the Attorney General regularly brings antitrust actions under federal law in federal court and, for this additional reason, there is no need for the proposed regulations.

³ See, e.g., Meyer v. Cmty. Coll., 93 A.3d 806, 814 (Pa. 2014) ("[T]he legislature enacted the UTPCPL to account for the fundamental inequality between buyer and soller, and to protect consumers from exploitative merchants."); Ash v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 877, 881 (Pa. 2007) ("[t]he UTPCPL provides consumers with a cause of action against commercial misfcasance" and its "objective" is "protecting the consumers of this Commonwealth"); Weinberg v. Sun Co., Inc., 777 A.2d 442, 446 (Pa. 2001) ("statutory language [is] directed against consumer fraud"); DeArmitt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 73 A.3d 578, 591 (Pa. Super. 2013) ("legislative goal" of UTPCPL is "consumer protection"); Commonwealth ex rel. Kane v. Flick, 382 A.2d 762, 765 (Pa. 1978) ("We have held on numerous occasions that the legislative purpose in enacting the [UTPCPL] was to protect the consuming public. . . ."); Commonwealth v. Hush-Tone Indus., Inc., 4 Pa. Commw. 1, 11 (1971) (UTPCPL "is a consumer protection law designed to broaden the protections afforded buyers by existing state law"); see also 39 Pa. Legis. J.—House 1089, 1163 (June 27, 1968) (statement of Rep. Manderino) ("The customer, the customer, the one whom we are really trying to protect by this consumer legislation").

II. The Proposed Regulations Impermissibly Re-Write the General Assembly's Definition of "Trade" and "Commerce."

As enacted by the General Assembly, the UTPCPL prohibits enumerated acts or practices "in the conduct of any trade or commerce," 73 P.S. § 201-3, a phrase which is statutorily defined in 73 P.S. § 201-2(3). The Attorney General is proposing to rewrite and expand the General Assembly's definition of "trade" and "commerce" by inserting the two new phrases in **bold** below:

> Trade and commerce—mean the advertising, offering for sale, sale or distribution, which are classes of transactions without regard to any further limitation or specification as to a person, of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situate, and includes any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this Commonwealth, including any transaction proposed, initiated or engaged by any person regardless of privity within the market structure.

See Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.2 (emphasis added). The proposed regulation would materially alter and expand the General Assembly's definition by making all "classes of transactions" subject to the statute without any "limitation or specification." This is impermissible. Statutes passed by the General Assembly cannot be amended through administrative rulemaking. See, e.g., Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 193 A.3d 447, 476 (Pa. 2018) (regulatory definition that expands upon and does not track statute is void and unenforceable); Commonwealth v. Kerstetter, 94 A.3d 991, 110-11 (Pa. 2014) (regulation that conflicts with statute "must stand down").⁶

III. The Proposed Regulations Impermissibly Re-Define "Sale" to Include the Act of Buying.

As an apparent hedge against an adverse ruling by the Supreme Court in the Pending Litigation, the proposed regulations include a new definition of "sale" that would equate the act of selling with the act of buying and thereby make buyers and consumers also subject to liability under the statute. See Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.2. This is also impermissible because it defics the General Assembly's intent. The lack of a definition of "sale" in the UTPCPL evidences the legislature's intent that the term is to be construed according to its "common and approved" meaning. 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 1903(a); Barasch v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 490 A.2d 806, 810 (Pa. 1985). Moreover, any such regulation would be invalid because it is patently unreasonable to define a term to include both its common meaning and the opposite of that common meaning.

⁶ Attached as Exhibit "C" is a redlined version of the UTPCPL showing the Attorney General's proposed redraft of the statutory provisions.

IV. The Proposed Definitions of "Deceptive Conduct" and "Unfair Conduct" Would Improperly Expand Statutory Liability and Are Unconstitutionally Vague.

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking includes new prohibitions against "unfair conduct" and "deceptive conduct" and defines those phrases both broadly and subjectively so that virtually every business practice and transaction would arguably fall within the scope of the UTPCPL. Under the proposed regulations, "deceptive conduct" would be defined as "[a] method, act or practice which has the capacity or tendency to deceive." See Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.2. "Unfair conduct" would be defined as "[a] method, act or practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, which violates public policy as established by any statute, the common law, or otherwise within at least the penumbra of any common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; which is unscrupulous, oppressive or unconscionable; or which causes substantial injury to a victim." See Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.2.7 The proposed new definitions and the corresponding reference in proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.11(b) conflict with 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(xxi) which states that "other fraudulent or deceptive conduct" not specifically enumerated in subsections (i)-(xx) is actionable only if it "creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding." 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(xxi). The Attorney General's construction of "deceptive conduct" would lower the standard of liability set by the General Assembly from "likely" to deceive to "hav[ing] the capacity" to deceive.⁸ Again, statutes cannot be amended by regulation. Moreover, the proposed definitions are unconstitutionally vague. How can a person tell whether specific conduct falls within "at least the penumbra of . . . [an] established concept of unfairness" or qualifies as "oppressive or unconscionable"? The lack of a clear and objective standard renders the proposed regulations unconstitutional. Nelson v. State Bd. of Veterinary Med., 863 A.2d 129, 138 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) ("A statute or regulation is unconstitutionally vague when its terms are not sufficiently specific to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties."). This is all the more true of the regulation's effort to impose liability based on a mere showing that the conduct at issue "causes substantial injury to a victim." The proposal to expand the UTPCPL to regulate "deceptive" and "unfair" conduct as defined by the Attorney General is invalid for all of these reasons.

⁸ The Attorney General admits in response to Question 10 on the Regulatory Analysis Form that the proposed regulations "would serve to lower the hurdle for consumers" under the UTPCPL.

⁷ The proposed definition of "unfair conduct" appears to be based on factors considered by the Federal Trade Commission in developing rules under the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 45, to regulate cigarette advertising. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972) (citing Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8355 (1964)). Factors considered in formulating specific rules under the FTC Act are not suited to serve as specific rules under the UTPCPL. Unlike the FTC Act which generally prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices and authorizes the FTC to issue rules governing specific conduct or to commence administrative proceedings to enjoin unfair or deceptive conduct on a prospective basis, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b), (m), the UTPCPL prohibits specifically enumerated practices and authorizes relief only in the event of a proven violation of one of those provisions, 73 P.S. §§ 201-2(4), 201-3.

V. The Proposal to Allow the Attorney General to Veto Class Action Settlements Would Re-Write the Statute and Violate the Separation of Powers.

In an apparent effort to avoid repetition of the situation in *Demchak*, the Attorney General is proposing to grant to himself extra-statutory authority to veto any settlement of any class claim under the UTPCPL. See Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.9(c). The proposal is directly contrary to the enforcement scheme in the UTPCPL. Under the statute, the Attorney General is only authorized to bring an action "to restrain by temporary or permanent injunction the use of [a] method, act or practice" declared unlawful in the statute. 73 P.S. § 201-4. The General Assembly left it to "the court" to determine whether restitution, 73 P.S. § 201-4.1, or civil penalties, 73 P.S. § 201-8(b), are warranted in an action brought by the Attorney General. The UTPCPL includes a separate private action provision which is complete in itself and does not allow for any involvement by the Attorney General. See 73 P.S. § 201-9.2. It would be inconsistent with the UTPCPL to permit the Attorney General to intervene or play any role in private actions under the statute.

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking opines that "coordination" with private actions is neccssary "to avoid protracted disputes over representation," see Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at p.9, but the Attorney General has no authority to represent individuals seeking money damages under the UTPCPL. The Attorney General's authority is limited to bringing "an action in the name of the Commonwealth . . . to restrain by temporary or permanent injunction" a violation of the act. 73 P.S. § 201-4 (emphasis added). It is also inaccurate for the Attorney General to posit that a "parens patriae action" under the UTPCPL is necessarily "superior" to a private class action. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at pp.9-10. Courts that have considered the issue have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. BASF Corp., No. 3127, Control No. 120186, 2001 WL 1807788, at *8 (Phila. Cty. 2001) ("In order to assure the finality of the Class Action settlement and to adhere to the District Court's exclusive jurisdiction over the settlement, this court cannot allow the Commonwealth to assert parens patriae claims on behalf of Pennsylvania citizens who released the Defendants for the same conduct alleged in this action."); In re Am. Inv'rs Life Ins. Co. Annuity Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 05-md-1712, 2013 WL 3463503, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 2013) (enjoining Attorney General's pursuit of restitution claims under UTPCPL on behalf of class members because "the potential for disruption to the terms of the [pending class action] settlement overrides the Attorney General's need to pursue a [different] remedy in its state court proceeding").9

More fundamentally, the proposal to confer on the Attorney General veto authority over class action settlements would be unenforceable. With respect to actions brought in state court, the Pennsylvania Constitution gives the Supreme Court exclusive authority over procedural matters. Pa. Const. Art. 5, § 10(c). The Supreme Court exercised that authority by promulgating detailed procedural rules governing class actions, including Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1714 which confers on the courts the exclusive authority to approve class action settlements and directs that such approval may be given only after a hearing and notice to all class members. Pa. R. Civ. P. 1714(a), (c). The Attorney General's proposal to grant himself

⁹ The case cited in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, *Commonwealth v. Budget Fuel Co., Inc.*, did not involve a claim under the UTPCPL. 122 F.R.D. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1988).

veto power over the settlement of UTPCPL class claims infringes on the Supreme Court's exclusive domain and is unconstitutional. See, e.g., In re Suspension of Capital Unitary Review Act, 722 A.2d 676 (Pa. 1999) (suspending statutory provision which is inconsistent with procedural rules promulgated by Supreme Court). In federal court, procedural matters are governed exclusively by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010), and therefore federal class action settlements are subject only to the notice and approval requirements in the federal rules.

VI. The Proposed Regulations Would Impermissibly Rewrite the UTPCPL Remedies Provision.

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposes to add a new definition of "rebate," see Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.2, and to rewrite two different provisions in the UTPCPL, 73 P.S. § 201-4 and 73 P.S. § 201-8, to correspond to the Attorney General's view that rebates paid to a consumer should not reduce any monetary award or other relief available under the UTPCPL. See Proposed 37 Pa. Code §§ 311.4, 311.7(b). The proposed regulations are invalid in that they purport to rewrite the statute. See supra § II. Further, the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. TAP Pharm. Prods., Inc. deemed it untenable to refuse to account for rebates in awarding relief under the UTPCPL. 94 A.3d 350, 362 (Pa. 2014) ("[W]e are disturbed by the Commonwealth's failure to account in this litigation for the billion dollars of rebate monies it has received from defendant drug manufacturers in the relevant time period.").

VII. The Attorney General's Effort to Grant Himself Broad Subpoena Power Exceeds the Authority Conferred by the General Assembly.

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposes to authorize the Attorney General to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of records and to utilize the subpoenaed testimony and records in any action under the UTPCPL. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at p.10; see also Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.10. The proposed regulation would substantially expand the authority of the Office of Attorney General and is inconsistent with the UTPCPL. As noted above, the statute includes a comprehensive enforcement scheme that empowers the Attorney General only to bring an action for injunctive relief to restrain prohibited acts. 73 P.S. § 201-4. The General Assembly did not intend and the statute does not contemplate separate administrative investigation and enforcement proceedings by the Attorney General prior to or in conjunction with an injunction proceeding under § 201-4. In fact, the General Assembly initially included in the UTPCPL a provision authorizing the Attorney General to obtain information from suspected violators through a civil investigative demand, but that section—71 P.S. § 201-6—was deleted in 1976. Further, the Commonwealth Court has already rejected an effort to read *the very same subpoena provision*¹⁰ into the UTPCPL in

¹⁰ The proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.10 is virtually identical to 71 P.S. § 307-3 which grants the Bureau of Consumer Protection power to issue subpoenas for use in purely adjudicatory as opposed to investigatory proceedings.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Packel v. Shults, 362 A.2d 1129, 1133-34 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976).

VIII. The Attorney General's Attempt at Statutory Interpretation Through Regulation Is Improper.

In the proposed regulations, the Attorney General purports to direct how the draft regulations and UTPCPL should be interpreted. See Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.11(a), (b). The proposal to apply the UTPCPL without limitation conflicts with the legislature's intent that the statute applies to "consumer transactions." See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, ex rel. Creamer v. Monumental Props., Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 824 (Pa. 1974).

IX. The Proposed Regulations Will Result in Increased Costs to Taxpayers.

Because the Office of Attorney General is proposing to expand its authority through administrative rulemaking to include the power to bring state antitrust claims under the UTPCPL, the power to review and veto UTPCPL class actions and the power to pursue UTPCPL claims against any type or class of transaction and against buyers as well as sellers, the new regulations, if promulgated, would certainly result in substantial cost to the Commonwealth, to persons doing business in the Commonwealth and to class members in actions brought under the UTPCPL. The Attorney General's assertions that the regulations would have "no adverse fiscal impact" and would result in "no expected costs" are wildly inaccurate. *See* Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at p.11; Regulatory Analysis Form No. 18.

* * * *

Thank you for your consideration of these comments.

Sincercly.

cc: Honorable Lisa Baker, Majority Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee (via UPS overnight mail) Honorable Lawrence Farnese, Jr., Minority Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee (via UPS overnight mail)

Honorable Rob Kauffman, Majority Chair, House Judiciary Committee (via UPS overnight mail)

Honorable Tim Briggs, Minority Chair, House Judiciary Committee (via UPS overnight mail)


Exhibit A

COMPARISON OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING TO ANTITRUST BILLS REJECTED BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY ¹								
Term .	Bill No.	Prohibits restraint of trade (Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.2)	Prohibits monopoly (Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.2)	Authorizes AG to issue subpoenas (Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.10)	Authorizes parens patriae action by AG (Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.2, § 311.3, § 311.4)	Authorizes AG recovery for indirect purchases (Proposed 37 Pa, Code § 311.2)	Requires notice to AG (Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.9(c))	Authorizes AG to Intervene in private action (Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.9(c))
1975-76	SB 369							
1975-76	HB 174				✓			
1977-78	HB 845	1	1					
1979-80	HB 1594	1	v					
1989-90	SB 1470	1				· · ·	<u> </u>	
1989-90	SB 1473	1						
1989-90	HB 2622	1						<u> </u>
1989-90	SB 2396					√	· · · ·	
1989-90	SB 2376	×				V		
1991-92	SB 351		1		1	1		
1991-92	SB 347		1			✓		
<u>1991-92</u>	HB 191	×	~		-	✓		
1993-94	SB 1630							
1 <u>993-</u> 94	SB 307				1	✓		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	HB 426				1	1		
1995-96	SB 611			1		- 7	✓	
1995-95	HB 525				✓			
1990-00	SB 1562	1			1		V	
2001-02	SB 21			√ ⊨	✓			
2003-04	SB 120			. /	V	1		
2005-06	SB 106				1			
2007-08	SB 203	1		1	✓			
2011-12	SB 1565	1	1		1	1		
2013-14	SB 848	1	✓ * ○	1		1		
2015-16	SB 578	✓				V		
2017-18	SB 858		1		V V	1		

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¹ This chart identifies instances of duplication between Proposed Rulemaking #59-10 and the 26 failed antitrust bills that are most pertinent to the attached comments. It is not an exhaustive comparison of the proposed regulations and failed bills.

Exhibit B



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SENATOR GREENLEAF: This bill was drawn up before committee and it was designed to take testimony to deal with some of the issues and questions that the committee members had and possibly the Jegislature in general would have. The declaration and purpose of this legislation quote is, "To promote free enterprise and free trade in the marketplaces of this Commonwealth by prohibiting restraints of trade which are secured through monopolistic or collusive practices which act or tend to act to create competition between persons engaged in commerce or trade, whether in manufacturing, distribution of financing, service industries or related for-profit or non-profit pursuits." Basically, to make sure that we have free enterprise and a fair competition in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania which I think is a worthy cause. It does not restrict the free enterprise system. It encourages it and makes sure it was fair. So, today, I want to thank all of the witnesses that have come here today to testify in regard to this

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legislation and to our members of the committee who are here today as well. And we will take testimony now. The first witness is James Donahue, Executive Deputy Attorney General, Public Protection Division; Tracy Wertz, Acting Chief Deputy Attorney General, Antitrust Section; Joseph S. Betsko, Senior Deputy Attorney General in the Antitrust Section. All of the Office of Attorney General, thank you, very much, for being here today. And I know the Office of the Attorney General is very interested in this legislation and we appreciate you being here today and to explain the need for it.

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MR. DONAHUE: Thank you, Chairman Greenleaf. Chairman Greenleaf, Chairman Leech, thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today about the State Antitrust Bill. My name is James Donahue and I am the Executive Deputy Director for the Public Protection Division for Attorney General Kathleen Kane. From July 1997 through January of this year, I served as the Chief of the Antitrust Section for the Office. With me today is Tracy Wertz who is the

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Acting Chief Deputy Attorney General and Joseph Betsko who is the Senior Deputy Attorney General in the Antitrust Section. Wellyempropaned.detailed.written.testimony. which we be submitting My oral remarks today will cover the highlights. The antitrust laws have been described as the Magna Carter of free enterprise and an economic bill of rights. Those descriptions apply because competition is at the core of our economy. When markets are competitive, overall economic activity increases. When competition is stifled, economic activity declines. As we note in our written testimony, the Antitrust Law is derived from old Common Law principles prohibiting monopolies and then state law which codifies those principles. What I'd like to do today is spend some time here addressing why we need this statute now. We need this statute because we need competitive markets. In competitive markets, prices are low. Over my 28 years in the Office of Attorney General, I've looked at internal documents of dozens of businesses. The one common

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thing in those business documents is the amount of effort businesses place into reducing their costs. In some cases the entirety of business planning focuses on how to shave a half percent out of a business's cost structure. When markets are competitive and there's vigorous antitrust enforcement keeping them so, businesses have a better ability to control costs. One aspect of costs many businesses focus on is health care. The changes in the health care marketplace have led to huge increase in consolidation. We currently have four open hospital mergers and we've been told we're getting another hospital merger coming in tomorrow or Thursday. Our job in these hospital transactions is to determine--did my mic go off? They're hard to SENATOR GREENLEAF:

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read, but if you push the bottom button there and the light should go on with a green light. MR. DONAHUE: The green light is on.

MR. DONAHUE: The green right is on. SENATOR GREENLEAF: There you go. MR. DONAHUE: Sorry, I must have

6 accidentally hit the button. I apologize. Anyway, we currently have four open hospital transactions and we're getting a fifth soon. Our job in these transactions is to take and look at them and determine whether they're actually efficiency enhancing, meaning they reduce costs. And make access to healthcare more available to consumers and to businesses. Or whether they do the opposite, whether they result in the increase in price and exclusions for--from the market or less access for consumers and businesses. And we've seen transactions in the healthcare market that have fit both molds. And we've been very active in our hospital reviews. In some cases, we've advised the hospitals that we don't have a problem with their transaction, other times we've advised that we would go forth and challenge those transactions. And we think in those instances when we've done that, we've saved the public and we've saved the business community millions of dollars in cost savings. You may have seen, you know, some of the recent articles about hospital

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pricing in Time Magazine and other places and the big disparity in differences. So why this is so important is that if you have a high priced hospital that merges with with a low priced hospital, their goal typically is to bring the low priced hospital's prices up to the prices of the higher priced hospital. One of the key reasons that an ahtitrust statute is needed now vie to sgive the office the ability to subpoana information. Accurate, honest and timely information is essential for a careful investigation which yields the right results. Without subpoena power, the office has to rely on the targets of the investigations to voluntarily give us or give us the information. Or, we have to rely on what we can obtain from our colleagues in the federal government or other states. Unfortunately, while many persons are cooperative, not all are. Moreover the discussions about confidentiality of documents can dramatically slow down an investigation. This is especially a problem again in

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healthcare where often times one of the merging partles says that we need to merge and we want you to overlook potentially any competitive problems that are raised by this transaction because wo're in a state of financial distress. Often times that puts us in the untenable situation having an entity in financial distress but not getting the information because we've been arguing over how the documents will be kept confidential and that type of thing. Another key reason we need an antitrust statute is because antitrust violations occur at all levels of the chain of distribution. In recent years, many antitrust violations have involved foreign manufacturers of components in other products. Those cases have involved computer chips, LCD screens and automotive parts among others. With limited exceptions, we've not been able to recover for the increased costs of these price fixing conspiracies imposed on consumers and state agencies. The reason we are not able to recover is that we are indirect

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purchasers of these products from the price Under a 1977 Supreme Court case, fixers. indiffect punchasers are unable to collect The theory is that drug purchasers **ដ៏ធំ**ព័ត៌ជូទូន. will have the same incentive to sue and that courts can (indecipherable 7:40) duplicative The reality is that many direct recovery. purchasers have little incentive to sue. And because they don't want to sue the people they do business with on a regular Many states, approximately 30 states basis. currently have some type of indirect purchaser standing to collect damages. And many of those states have set up in their statutes as is set up in this statute a requirement that the court avoid duplicative recoveries in handling an indirect purchaser I would like to point out that when case. our authority is clear, we've been extremely successful. Over the past year, we returned almost twenty million dollars to Pennsylvania governmental entitles who were victimized by a bid rigging scheme involving municipal bond derivatives. Our work involving hospital mergers have saved

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consumers and businesses including health plans and insurance companies tens of millions of dollars. Lastly, we believe it is important that Pennsylvania have a law that prohibit retail price maintenance, the practice of manufacturers setting the price in which retailers can sell their manufacturers--their goods. This practice limits retail competition and stifles the growth of efficient retailers. Pennsylvania . consumers should have the advantages of a vigorous retail price competition. I just want to make two other quick points, there's been some concern about the insurance industry. At present, there is an exemption for the insurance industry called the McCarran Ferguson Act. This act doesn't change that exception. Now, I should be clear that the McCarran Ferguson exception applies to the business of insurance. And that's generally seen as managing risks and, you know, handling the actuarial part of the insurance business. There is case law that says the business of insurance does not include the relationship between insurers

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and providers. And as I'm sure many of you are well aware, there is quite a dispute right now ongoing about the relationship between insurers and providers in the western part of the State. So that type of--the actions of providers generally don't fall within the business of insurance. But this bill really changes nothing in terms of whether the insurance companies would be regulated or not regulated by our office. And I'd be happy to answer any other questions that you might have. SENATOR GREENLEAF: A couple and then we'll take questions from the members. We're one of the--the only state that has no antitrust legislation or laws in place. MR. DONAHUE: That's correct.

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SENATOR GREENLEAF: And how does this proposed bill compare to the other statutes if you're familiar with them? Are they very similar or does this go beyond what the other states do?

MR. DONAHUE: 'No, many--the key components for us in this statute are the ability to issue subpoenas, the ability to

bring an indirect purchaser claim and a dan onsmetail price maintenance. In terms of the general violation, a contract combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade, that's in everybody's statute. Thirty states have indirect purchaser legislation. Or, you know, they have some method of collecting damages from--sorry, from indirect price fixers. I think about 28 of those states, it's by legislation and in about four or five of those states it's by an opinion of the Supreme Court of that state that says their antitrust law covers indirect purchasers. A smaller group of states have a ban on retail price maintenance. Maryland just passed such a law a couple years ago. New York and California have similarly passed a law. Or, their courts have interpreted their long standing antitrust statutes as being--as covering that. I don't have a full count of which other states believe that the retail price minutes (indecipherable at: 12:00) is also, banned by other antitrust statutes. The important part I think we make in our

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13 paper there is that the federal antitrust 1 2 statutes are based on the original state antitrust statutes. Kansas passed the first 3 one in the late 1880's and then the Sherman 4 5 Act in 1890. SENATOR GREENLEAF: So does business 6 have any reason to fear the adoption of, 7 Pennsylvania, giving an antitrust piece of 8 9 law? MR, DONAHUE: I don't think so. Ι 10 mean, it weally doesn't change the laws that 11 are applicable to businesses right now. The 12 only reason you would have to fear is if 13 you're breaking the law currently because it 14 would give us more investigative powers. 15 SENATOR GREENLEAF: Okay, Senator, I 16 don't know which one was first? Senator 17 Boscola? 18 MAN: She's first. 19 SENATOR GREENLEAF: Okay. 20 SENATOR BOSCOLA: Is it good 21 afternoon yet? Close. Around here, yeah. 22 If Pennsylvania would enact the antitrust 23 legislation, does the Attorney General's 24 Office anticipate needing more resources to 25

process the claims?

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MR. DONAHUE: You know, the thing that is most resource intensive is the investigations. And we currently operate on sort of a resolving fund basis. So, we try to recover in our cases attorneys fees at commercial rates for our investigations and recover our costs. And then, we use that to fund the next case. So we wouldn't necessarily need additional resources in that sense. We should be able to grow our--the resources out of, you know, out of our litigation.

SENATOR BOSCOLA: That makes sense. And then, what would the ability to subpoena documents--you'd be able to subpoena documents, what would that do for prosecuting antitrust cases in the Commonwealth? Would it streamline the process?

MR. DONAHUE: It would do a couple things. Yes, it would streamline the process. Because, you know, one of the things that there--there are a couple of problems about the lack of subpoena power.

The biggest thing about that is that we can't compel people to give us information. Often times, the information is, it's a secret. You know, we don't have that information. In that municipal bond bid rigging case that I referred to which was followed along a federal, you know, a case; we were able to get tape recordings of traders, conversations with people and their y emails. And in those documents is where the evidence was of agreements to rig the bids on those municipal derivatives. So without the ability to compel that sort of information, you know, people don't normally turn over incriminating information to you. So that's why that's so important.

SENATOR BOSCOLA: I just have another question, I'm thinking that this price fixing issue is the main reason why we need antitrust. Is there any like solid evidence out there that price fixing was occurring but then you didn't have the tools to pursue the case or recover the damages? MR. DONAHUE: The one thing that

current--that this bill would change,

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16 currently we do sue people for price fixing. 1 And when we were direct purchasers. So the 2 banks that paid the money to us in the 3 municipal bond case were--they directly 4 dealt with either state agencies or 5 municipal agencies in terms of these 6 derivative instruments. What we don't have 7 the ability to do is to go after, you know, 8 say Korean makers of LCDs. Or, you know, 9 Japanese makers of auto parts or others who 10 were price fixing. Because we don't buy 11 from them. We buy a car or we buy, you 12 know, a computer. And the price fixing 13 occurred involving components of those 14 items. 15 SENATOR BOSCOLA: Got it, okay, 16 thanks. 17 SENATOR GREENLEAF: Senator Stack? 18 SENATOR STACK: Thanks for being 19 with us again, Mr. Donahue. Just to follow 20 up a few things that Senator Boscola raised. 21 And I have no problem with the Attorney 22 General having subpoena power. But, I'm 23 just trying to wrap my head around how far 24 are we going with it? We're talking about 25

the antitrust issue. But do we envision that that subpoena power will be vast and beyond antitrust? Or are we talking in a limited way? And I understand that surrounding states have also expanded the power of their Attorney General in antitrust cases, but I also have become aware that in . Virginia they've run into some problems and they're scaling that -- they're trying to scale back those particular powers. So how would you comment about what would be the scope of the powers we're talking about? And I guess the last point I would throw out to you is -- and I always talk about Pennsylvania being behind other states, you know, often the last to do certain things. But, this is really interesting that we're the last state to try and do this. And what's the tipping point? What's pushed it over the top where we've said, look, we've got to change things here?

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MR. DONAHUE: Okay, in terms of the subpoena power and the broadness of the subpoena power, the--we have subpoena power in a number of statutes. For example, in

the administrative code, it gives the Attorney General the ability to subpoena information and conduct studies for issues involving consumer protection. We've been, I think we've been a good steward of that power by not using that just willy nilly for The Idea here is that this anything. statute wound invoive the abiinty to รมอออธิกลั ให้สี่อักหลังไอการให้ "you know, แจ้ การลpure antitrust case which didnict involve. deception which is something we don that ave. right now." We do have the ability to subpoena information in a bid rigging case where the governmental --where there is a--where the bids being rigged are governmental bids. Businesses often go out for bids too, but we don't have any jurisdiction over whether somebody would rig a bid on a business contract to build a building or something like that. That's outside of the anti-bid rigging act. So we have a number of statutes right now that currently give us the ability to issue subpoenas. And the office traditionally has only used those for the specific purpose

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they're intended. And I don't see any 🥲 reason why that would change. The other 🗠 question you asked was about the ability, you know, why--what is the tipping point? Why should we do this now? And I think the, yeah, there's a couple reasons. And I don't want to sound like a broken record and keep coming back to healthcare. But healthcare is an extremely important part of the economy both in terms of an input to what businesses use in producing their products, but also to a significant player here in Pennsylvania. We have some of the most prominent hospitals in the world here located within the state. So, it's a very important part of the economy. And it's a very complex business. And we get, you know, probably more complaints about stuff in healthcare than any other area. And being able to fully investigate those complaints and look at them is, I think, very important as that market is going to go through a lot of changes for whatever reason. They're going to go through a lot of changes over the next couple years. And

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	that's one of the reasons we think that this
	bill is so important to us.
	SENATOR GREENLEAF: Senator Farnese?
	SENATOR FARNESE: Thank you, Mr.
	Chairman. Thank you for your testimony, Mr.
	Donahue, I appreciate it. It was very
	helpful. Just a couple of follow up
23	questions. On the resources for the
	Attorney General's Office, in terms of the
•	number of cases, I've looked at some states
	around, you mentioned two of the states that
	I actually looked at to see exactly what
	their current case load was of antitrust
	case. And I sort of was surprised when I
	saw. For instance, Maryland, Maryland does
	about one case per year with the number of
	cases in settlement. They have four
	antitrust lawyers on staff. They can get
	attorneys fees in their statute. New York,
	most cases in New York are federal, of
	course, because of the federal statutes.
	But allow them, of course, they take
	advantage of the pendent jurisdiction and
	they can bring the state law claims in the
	federal court. They have 14 assistant

21 generals working on antitrust cases there. In Delaware, they have one person doing antitrust work. And once again, they utilize, they take advantage of the · multistate litigation and the feds bring the action and they share it. But again they believe that they have a positive flow, the money coming in is positive. So, I don't know, sort of Senator Boscola asked about your resources right now, do you anticipate--right now you have a full. complement of attorneys to handle these types of cases? I know you originally said that resources were the number one--or the investigation was where you bring resources. I would also offer that not only is the investigation, but the litigation of these types of cases is extremely document sensitive, as you know. I mean, I've been involved in actions where they've got rooms the size of this with 15 or 20 lawyers just coding documents all day long. And the large law firms make a lot of money doing this. So, it's very easy to get papered to death in a case like this. So again, do you

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22 think you have the complement ready right 1 now to begin handling these cases if, in 2 fact, the statute goes in effect? And 3 again, I think it's important that the 4 subpoena power -- this is not within the 5 context of litigation, this is 6 pre-litigation, this is investigation work. 7 So people understand what we're talking 8 about. A lot of people think subpoenas are 9 part in parcel of a lawsuit, whether it be 10 in a criminal or a civil case. You're 11 talking about, you're doing your 12 pre-investigation work before litigation is 13 even started. That's the subpoena power 14 that you're seeking through this statute. I 15 just want to make sure we're clear on that. 16 NR. DONAHUE: Yes, to take your last 17 point first, yes, we're absolutely clear. 18 It's pre-complaint subpoena power and it 19 One of the enables us to investigate. 20 reasons that that's important is there's a 21 lot of criticism about the filing of cases, 22 especially the filing of antitrust cases and 23 the filing of class actions. And often 24 times there might be a little clip in the 25

paper about something. And then, the next day there's a dozen class actions that are filed. And it may turn out after 3 years of litigation that that wasn't meritorious. The Attorney Generals don't operate that way. The Attorney Generals actually look and see whether there's a legitimate basis for a complaint. In terms of resources currently we have six attorneys in there. We currently have one vacancy because I've been promoted from Chief of the Antitrust Section to head of the Public Protection Division. Depending how other events happen this week involving the budget, we hopefully will be able to fill that position once that is all cleared up. We have a number of tools for working on these cases and using resources in a way where we're effective. For example, we do work a lot with the federal agencies, both the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice. And, you know, as you know from talking to some of the other states, we work with them very much. So, again, I'll go back to the municipal derivatives case.

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What we did there is we got digital files, digital electronic files of the traders tapes and each state took a bank. And, we divided that work up that way. We are Jooking at some tools now, some computer tools that will enable us to sort through documents quicker. And we're looking at, you know, we're actually testing that in an investigation right now. One of those tools that uses artificial intelligence to help us find documents. And we're hoping that with those types of tools that we use together with ourselves and other states that we will have the resources to do this. And, you know, if worse comes--not if worse comes to worse, you know, we roll up our sleeves and get to work. It's not, you know, people come in and say, why do you want to work for the Office of Attorney General? And they say, well, I want to be able to go home and have--that's not the antitrust section. One of our attorneys here, her first week here, we worked till midnight every night to bring a case there. So, we have dedicated people, hard working people. And we're trying to

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use everything we can, working with other people and technology to get through this stuff.

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Just one more SENATOR FARNESE: question if I can, Mr. Chairman, I understand there's concerns about the resources of your office. Another thing I'm very concerned about is the resources and ability of the Commonwealth Court. Ny understanding is pursuant to the statute that original jurisdiction would then vest with the Commonwealth Court. And I haven't really, I don't think there's anybody here from the court system that's going to testify as to whether or not they're going to be able to handle this load. Again, we're not talking about your normal run of the mill litigation which might originate in Commonwealth Court whether it be an election case or some kind of other Workers' Compensation matters, whatever it might be. These, again, are very complex document In federal court, if you intensive cases. look in federal court, they usually have a separate documenting track that handles your

antitrust cases and a federal judge is usually assigned to those. You know, even if there's a negligible increase in the amount of case load that the Commonwealth Court is going to have, I think we need, I think the legislature needs confidence that the court is going to be able to handle it, that they're going to have the personnel, that they have an ability to set these cases up and someone's going to handle them with the expertise in antitrust law and handle this kind of stuff. Again, I think it's going to be a cost not only to the Attorney General's Office, but again, you know, there's going to be a cost associated with this to the court system to bear that. And I don't know if we've--I haven't really heard a lot about that in some discussions I've had, but I think we need reassurances from the court that not only are they going to be able to handle this, but they're prepared for this kind of litigation

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MR. DONAHUE: Well, let me address that two ways. First off, there has to be some Pennsylvania court that would have

jurisdiction over this. And we had the exact same concern about the county courts if we were to bring these sort of complex cases into the--you know, into the county courts. Because they have the same issues as everybody else. We have had some--we do have--

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SENATOR FARNESE: Which is why the federal Counts are necessarily or usually are the place for this type--because in federal court you get a very quick docket, you get a Judge that doesn't take any BS and the case just goes right through. And there's no backlog. That's my big concern. With federal court, you don't see that as much.

MR. DONAHUE: And many of our cases are brought in federal court and our colleagues cases. As you mentioned New York will bring a case with a federal count and with a state law count. And there are a lot good reasons why we would continue to go into federal court in many circumstances for the very issues that you raise. Because we know there are some federal court judges who

are experienced in, you know, partipular issues. And, you know, it makes sense to go there. Or there may be companion litigation going on already where it makes sense to go before the same judge. I'm not a big fan of like going into four different courts on the same case. If there's already a case going on in federal court and we've got a federal claim, even though we have a state law claim, I would probably go into federal court in that circumstance, yeah, yeah.

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SENATOR FARNESE: You're not going to have any choice. The case would go to federal court. I don't believe you'd be able to litigate, you know as well as I do, you couldn't litigate two cases, one in federal court and one in state court. The case would just go to federal court. It would be a pendent claim.

MR. DONAHUE: Now, I can't speak for Commonwealth court.

SENATOR FARNESE: Right, that's my

MR. DONAHUE: I wouldn't--SENATOR FARNESE: Let me just close

with this, have you had any discussions with the court or maybe Mr. Chairman sometime you could look into the court to see, you know, what their abilities are right now to handle these kinds of cases moving forward? You know, just throwing that out there.

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SENATOR GREENLEAF: We can make an inquiry for you.

SENATOR FARNESE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Donahue, for your testimony. Again, I understand what you want to do. I think it's-- certainly supportive of it. I just want to make sure in terms of the resources that are there, not only for your office, but for the judicial system as well too that's going to be handling them.

MR. DONAHUE: I just want to clarify we do have original jurisdiction in Commonwealth Court in a lot of the actions we bring. And some of your charities actions and consumer protection actions are also extremely complicated and document intensive, so it's not that they're unfamiliar with these type of cases. Thank

you.

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SENATOR GREENLEAF: Senator

SENATOR VULAKOVICH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I was going over pages 8, 9--8 and 9 and 10. I was wondering if we would pass this piece of legislation, what--I guess, standing would the Attorney General have with regards to the recent West Bend Allegheny Highmark merger and you might say versus UPMC. For example, they recently came out and said that the--I know there's exemptions for insurance. But then you mentioned this one act, was it McFarran?

MR. DONAHUE: McCarran Ferguson. SENATOR VULAKOVICH: McCarran Ferguson, yes. Which I believe provides a limited exception for the business of insurance. How would the Attorney General play into a situation where UPMC comes out and says that we're no longer going to accept Highmark Insurance for our doctors, our hospitals, we're going to stop that, cease and desist at the end of the year. Would you be able to then take a position on

		31
1	1 . that? If	somebody came to you? Because
2	2	R. DONAHUE: Ifalright.
3	3 5	ENATOR VULAKOVICH: Ifon Page 9,
4	4 let's see	, Page 9oh, on the last Page 10
5	5 of your t	estimony, "Section 908 Senate Bill
6	6 848 gives	the Attorney General the authority
7	7 to issue	a subpoena whenever the Attorney
8	8 General I	believes that a person may be in
9	9 control (of information relevant to any civil
10	10 investig	ation brought to protect free
11	11 enterpri	se." Do you guyswould you partake
12	12 in somet	hing like that with what's going on
13	13 right no	w with these new IDFS systems?
14	14	MR. DONAHUE: Without violating our
15	15 normal p	olicy about not commenting on stuff
16	16 which mi	ght be under ourunder
17	17 investig	ation by this office, yes, we would"
18		whether a refusaï to deal by
19	19 somebody	is a violation of an antitrust"
20	20 violatio	n. In some circumstances, it is ä ^{br}
21	21 violatio	n. In other circumstances, it's "
22	22 not.	5
23	23	SENATOR VULAKOVICH: Okay, now, 18
24	24 there a	conflict of interest? You have the
25	25 Insuranc	e Department. And then, you have

32 the Attorney General. If we didn't have, if we don't pass this piece of legislation, can 2 you still do what I just talked about? 3 Still interfere in that? 4 MR. DONAHUE: The problem in, you 5 know, a case like that, is unless we have 6 access to the detailed internal information 7 of the companies, you know, we may not be 8 able to come to a conclusion as to whether 9 they're engaged in unlawful conduct or not. 10 SENATOR VULAKOVICH: Because you 11 won't have subpoena power. 12 MR. DONAHUE: Right. 13 SENATOR VULAKOVICH: Okay, but, 1f 14 we pass this piece of legislation, then that 15 could be something that you would be 16 involved in? I guess what I'm looking at 17 here is, are we going to have an issue here 18 with what the Department of Insurance does 19 as opposed to what you guys do? Or is it a 20 balancing effect that is good? I don't 21 22 know. MR. DONAHUE: First, we do work with 23 other state agencies and in all of these 24 hospital transactions I've been talking 25

about, we have worked closely with the Department of Health, Department of State and the Insurance Department. And we've reached out,to them, you know, some of these issues, especially when we get into these sort of modern type of transactions like Highmark West Penn or the fact that UPMC, you know, largely a hospital system has now gotten into the insurance business. You know, there have been arguments made by some of these companies that their activities and their activities outside of the pure business of insurance is outside the jurisdiction of the Insurance Department. So, what we have done, you know, in the past over the years, not just, you know, recently, but over the years we've worked with the Insurance Department. When we've had a case which involves insurance, we've talked to them about it. So I would envision that we would continue to work with the Insurance Department if we were to conclude that there was something that we needed to take action on in Western Pennsylvania.

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34 SENATOR VULAKOVICH: One other question, have you talked to the Insurance Department--since a lot of this what you've talked about here today in your testimony does involve a really new area with. insurance companies and providers of healthcare being in the same business, you know, we have Geisinger and UPMC over here and now we have a new one and they're literally across street from each other. So, you know, I tried to follow all of that when the insurance (indecipherable 35:40) doctors uncovered. Hospital's uncovered. Get paid out of plan. And before I did the piece of legislation over the hospital, I'm trying to decide here, is this something that we stick our nose into, this business area? But you've got two or three people, two or three million people that have Highmark and all of a sudden you have the major provider or the major insurer and then you have the major provider. And now, all of this is coming together in a gray blurry area. And it seems to me like something's going to blow up here. And so my question

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1	is, the insurance company, I would think 🛶
2	that because you spent a lot of time talking
3	about the possibility of insurance here with
4	the exemptions and a piece of, I guess, a
б .	court ruling; is it possible to have a
6	discussion with the Insurance Department to
7	say, do they see something here that could
8	cause a problem?
9	MR. DONAHUE: We communicate with
10	the Insurance Department all the time. And,
11	you know, especially with issues like the
12	high profile issues that are occurring in
13	Western Pennsylvania.
14	SENATOR VULAKOVICH: Okay and? And?
15	MR. DONAHUE: And, you know,
16	thewe'veI guess I'll say, we continue to
17	work together. I don't know what else I can
18	say there.
19	SENATOR VULAKOVICH: Alright, okay.
20	Thank you.
21	SENATOR GREENLEAF: Senator
22	Rafferty?
23	SENATOR RAFFERTY: Thank you, Mr.
24	Chairman, I'll be brief. I didn't practice
25	antitrust law and I'm fascinated by some of

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the questions that Senator Larry Farnese came up with it and found it very interesting, but what I do know is I happened to be presiding at the Appropriations Hearing a few years back at the request of the chairman when the then Attorney General Linda Kelly was speaking about the budget for the Attorney General's Office. And Senator Lisa Baker began to question her about antitrust statute and antitrust section, concerned about some of what was occurring within Pennsylvania. And Linda Kelly I thought gave a very direct and very forthright answer. And said, I especially need it as we see in the healthcare industry more and more mergers occurring. And it would be very helpful to us as we have to review these hospital mergers and health care mergers that we're able to obtain some of that information before we have to render a decision. I have the utmost respect for today's Attorney General Kathleen Kane and I'm taking as an inference for her wanting the same authority and abilities you being here that she's

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supportive of an antitrust statute as well. And it seems that we do find, first of all, I'm supportive of it. And I think that we do find and have found and continue to find funding when we want in this building for the Attorney General's Office. In fact, I'm one who every year I've been in this building have advocated for additional funding for the Attorney General's Office and did so again this year for Attorney General Kane. I know 253 people will be saying they did it if she gets additional funding in the budget. But there are a few of us who do advocate for the Attorney General and I will join with Senator Farnese on the question about the courts. But 1t seems that we also find funding mechanisms for the courts when we need to do so here in the Commonwealth. Whether it's direct funding or giving them a share of traffic fines, we're able to pump money into the courts. And I think that we would be willing to do that. Because the bottom line for me, we're protecting the public. If there's an antitrust action, I understand

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38 Insurance companies and the businesses and 5 · the hospitals. I know everybody's coming up here to talk about that afterwards. The bottom line for me is, if there is an action taken, the goal is to protect the public. And that's something that we're to do as legislators, you're to do as the attorney--well, Kathleen Kane is to do as the Attorney General, her office is to do and I think you're performing it well. And Linda Kelly wanted to do as Attorney General as well'. This is twice now I've heard it from the AG's Office the need for the statute. So I'll be supportive of it. And I'll continue to work--if that grows if we need additional funding, I'll continue to But I'm very work on that as well. interested in working with Senator Greenleaf and the members of the committee on some of the additional aspects of it and funding aspects of it, but I think what we can do to promote public protection is in our best interest in this building and I will be supportive of the legislation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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SENATOR GREENLEAF: Senator Gordner? SENATOR GORDNER: Thank you, just a couple of questions. One, in the proposed bill there is a provision that says that there is a four the recovery of damages. Many states do have a statute of limitations. I believe at the federal level, there's a four year. Does the Attorney General say that you need that? Or would you be willing to discuss an amendment that would put some reasonable statute of limitations on that provision?

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MR. DONAHUE: Well, let me be clear, there is a statute of limitations for all claims except for claims on behalf of Commonwealth agencies. And the reason there is no statute of limitations on behalf of the claims the Commonwealth may have is that we've incorporated the normal principle of time doesn't run against the King. So unless expressly excluded by statute, there is no statute of limitations generally on any claim the Commonwealth might have on behalf of its agencies for, you know,

violations of law that impact them. So, I just want to be clear that it's not a broad across the board, there's no statute of limitations. And it's not something really different than applies in other circumstances. It's, we're applying that principle that exists across, you know, across the board. But in terms of whether if it, you know, making it consistent with the federal statute which does have a four year statute of limitations with a couple extenders in there, that's not a problem for us.

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SENATOR GORDNER: Okay, again, ybu. Servicin you'r testimony you do a lot of things? Under common law, onder what you're doing under common law, is there a statute of limitations in regard to these types of--

MR. DONAHUE: Not to a claim--under common law, there would be a statute of limitations because there's a general statute of limitations for a claim on behalf of a consumer. So let's say, the case we've been talking about, the municipal bond derivatives. So one of the--even though they're called municipal bonds, like the Turnpike Commission, some state agencies issue these municipal bonds. That's the same the IRS gives to them even though they're not issued by municipalities, but--so their claim, if we were to assert those claims under common law, there would be no statute of limitations for a common law claim a state agency would have as a victim of bid rigging. That's the status of the law currently.

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SENATOR GORDNER: Okay, let me also talk about the indirect purchaser section here which I believe not all states that have antitrust laws have. Can you give me the arguments why that would be necessary for a final version of this?

MR. DONAHUE: The principal reason that would be necessary is that there has been a considerable amount of anti-competitive activity among manufacturers, especially foreign manufacturers. And the only way we can reach them is with an indirect purchaser statute. You know, a price increase in a

42 component of a, you know, of a computer or a car or that sort of thing, that gets passed onto us. But we don't, we currently don't have the ability to go out for that. And the majority of states now currently have that ability to, you know, get those damages. Okay and I'm going SENATOR GORDNER: to go ahead and ask this question, if this legislation passes and this Attorney General has the ability to use this, does--is it the intent of this Attorney General to take on this as a major emphasis of her tenure in office? MR. DONAHUE: The--I think the Attorney General has said that, you know, I think she's listed a wide range of priorities. You know, protection of children, protection of the elderly and increasing antitrust enforcement and a number of other things. So this would be one of her priorities. But it wouldn't be, you know, the priority. There are a whole list of things that she has said that are extremely important that she would like to

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SENATOR GORDNER: Thank you. SENATOR GREENLEAF: Any other questions? Thank you so much for being here today. Thank you. Okay, our next witness is Scott Dupree of counsel, Shook, Hardy and Bacon LLP and Samuel Denisco, Vice President Government Affairs, Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce. Gentlemen, thank you for being here today, please take a seat and there's two microphones there. So make sure they're on when you speak. I know there's a button at the bottom of the base of the microphone.

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MR. DENISCO: Thank you, Mr. Chairmans. Sam Denisco with the Pennsylvania Chamber. In the interest of time, I know we're running behind, I'm going to defer to Mr. Dupree who is going to deliver his testimony on behalf of the Pennsylvania Chamber.

MR. DUPREE: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the chamber regarding SB 848. My name is Scott Dupree. I practice commercial law and corporate law with Shook, Hardy and Bacon. We have an office in Philadelphia, but I actually reside in the Kansas City office. Although, I do represent clients that are nationwide employers that operate throughout the country. Oh, I believe so, yes, sir. I'm sorry, I'm sorry. I--yeah, I'm very sorry about that. I'm actually--well, I'll try to click my heels three times and maybe we'll get back there. But actually I'm having a little bit of trouble speaking as well because I'm either wrestling with a cold or allergies.

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SENATOR GREENLEAF: Take your time.

MR. DUPREE: My apologies. I actually was first admitted to practice a quarter of a century ago. And during most of that time, I've spent the better part of my time advising clients and litigating claims that relate to antitrust issues. It forms a significant part of my practice. And, in fact, in the first couple of years out of law school, I worked in the General Counsel's Office of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission where I gained an appreciation

for the objectives of antitrust law to promote competition, vigorous competition while enhancing the welfare of consumers. With that in mind, for--with those objectives in mind, I have serious concerns about Senate Bill 848. And I've tried to detail them at some length in the written testimony that I ve provided. In the interest of time and to avoid boring you all, I'm not going to read that testimony, but I would like to hit the high points. And there are four major objections that I have cited in that testimony. The first is that, in essence, notwithstanding the fine testimony of the Office of the Attorney General, this appears to be a bill that creates a solution in search of a problems As the Attorney General representative duly noted, they've done an outstanding job of bringing actions under the federal antitrust laws because t<u>he</u> federal antitrust <u>la</u>w already provide them with authority to brand direct triple damages actions, injunctivea: actions parens patriae actions on behalf of the residents of the Commonwealth. As the

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first several pages of their testimony recount in some detail, they have been enormously successful in obtaining substantial judgments and settlements on behalf of the Commonwealth and its residents for a great period of time. The statute 🛩 itself. the substantive violations enumerated in the statute essentially parallel those that already exist under" federal law. Now, I notice that he did refer to the RPM provision and he's referring to a change in federal law that occurred not too long ago called the degden Decision (sic). The only change that that law created was to rather than make resale price maintenance claims pepsise unlawful, it applied the so called nuinesofereason so that basically courts were required to analyze the economic effects of relationships between different parties at different stages of the chain of distribution. And the purpose of that, again, is to promote consumer welfare. Now, it's not clear to me based on the way this statute is worded that this statute would change that rule. But

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apparently, from what I understand from the Office of the Attorney General, that's their intent. So, that's my first major point. My second major point is that this bill will substantially increase the potential liability of persons doing business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania without substantially benefitted consumers in Pennsylvania. On the first point, the representative of the Office of Attorney General noted that--and correctly, that this, the statute will--would authorize indirect purchaser claims. Which are not authorized under federal law. And let's telk about that for a minute. You know, we throw around these antitrust terms of our direct purchaser, indirect purchaser. So what are we talking about? Direct purchasers are persons who deal directly with--purchase directly from an alleged antitrust violator. They absorb the entire amount of any price fixing overcharge. They sometimes pass, they certainly try to pass along that overcharge to others further along in the chain of distribution. And

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those persons who are more remote from the antitrust violator are called indirect purchasers. They are--they tend to be ultimately anywhere from--well, at some level they are either wholesalers or consumers. And so, they absorb a smaller amount of the overcharge to the extent the overcharge is even passed along to them. And so, as a result under federal law, federal law only recognizes remedy on behalf of direct purchasers for three reasons. First, understandably, if you recognize indirect purchaser claims, you inevitably create an increased risk of duplicative liability by an antitrust defendant for the very same conduct for the very same overcharge that's passed down from level to level in the chain of distribution. Second, you increase the complexity of antitrust litigation. And in the process, which you can easily understand because you're involving a lot more hogs at the trough--if I can use a Kansas expression--in prosecuting these claims and in allocating the harm among persons in that chain of

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distribution. And in the process of doing that, you are protracting the litigation and making it more costly. Thirdly, the direct purchasers do have the best incentive to bring antitrust claims to vindicate the antitrust laws as private Attorneys General. Now, I heard the representative of the Office of Attorney General discount that But, I'll tell you what, in claim. representing antitrust defendants in litigation, I have never found direct purchasers to be reluctant to bring antitrust claims where they think that they've been wronged by antitrust conduct. And in fact, with the increased emphasis in in-house counsel shops in being able to. justify their existence as--if they can--as profit setters. Not just a cost, but a profit setter for their companies, in-house counsel are constantly looking for opportunities to bring claims just like this as direct purchasers in order to show that they can actually add to the bottom line of their companies. So, I just don't buy it, buy the notion that direct purchasers are

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reluctant somehow to enforce the antitrust laws. This bill incorporates all those complexities. And then, it goes one further. Because it does not indicate whether or if so how an antitrust defendant could defend itself against the indirect purchaser claims by arguing the so called pass on defense. That is, if you as an indirect--as a direct purchaser or as a wholesaler, for example, pass on all or part of your overcharge from price fixing scheme, for example, well, were you even harmed then? You've been made whole by passing on that overcharge to someone else further down in the chain of distribution. Can an antitrust defendant defend by asserting that pass on defense? Under federal law, you cannot. And that's part of the reason why out of fairness federal law does not recognize indirect purchaser claims. It's not clear under this statute whether or not that defense would be recognized. And that creates a number of problems that I've described in more detail in the written testimony that I won't go into right now.

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But I'd be happy to answer questions about. The flip side of that -- I'm sorry, I don't want to preempt you, did you have a question? Oh, I'm sorry. I'm sorry. The flip side of that is, it's not clear to me that consumers actually gain from this. The representative of the Office of the Attorney General said, well, you know if you're not violating the antitrust laws, you've got nothing to fear from this. And therefore, businesses shouldn't be concerned about this bill. But that's not exactly the case. This will ultimately inevitably as Justice White recognized in the withinois-Brick decision and for a number of reasons enumerated in my written testimony lead to an inevitable increased risk in duplicative liability by anybody who is the subject of an antitrust claim. It also creates a certain coercive effect, let's face it, the indirect purchaser part of it in particular to settle those claims. That inevitably is an additional cost of doing business in Pennsylvania. And like any other cost of doing business, a rational business is going

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to ultimately factor that into the price of the goods that the consumers pay. So, consumers pay more, what do they get out of this bill? The Attorney General can bring parens patriag galaims on their behalf. The Attorney General doesn't have to prove that anyone in particular was injured under Section 906 as long as they can come up with a statistical method that a court is willing to buy off on. And then, if the Attorney General wins a judgment or a settlement under this bill, then under 905A, they can take their attorneys fees and costs or the attorneys fees and costs of any counsel that they hire to bring these claims off the top. And then, simply donate the rest to a charitable organization that is in good standing with the Department of State anytime that they feel that it's just too difficult to identify people who are In the words of the actually harmed. statute any time they determine that it's economically impractical to identify people who are actually harmed by the alleged conduct. So at the end of the day, the

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53 lawyers make out good. And as a lawyer I kind of like the sound of that. But the lawyers make out good, it's not clear that consumers actually benefit from this statute. So that's my second point. 111 brush over the other two points very quickly, but I'm happy to answer questions The third point is that this on them. admithed by as the representative of the " Attomby General's Office testified to at length does enhance the authority and powers of Attorney General, the investigative powers of the Attorney General. But, it doesnutwreally provide significant safeguards or limitations on the exercise of "that power. In that sense, I believe, although I must confess, I haven't done a 50 state survey in anticipation of this testimony. But, I believe that the investigative provisions of this bill may be out of step with the provisions that you typically find in other state's laws. For example, just to throw out one which is in the testimony, it is often the case that an Attorney General has to show--well, not has

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to show, but has to have reasonable cause to believe that an antitrust violation has occurred before initiating an investigation. And that's important because that frames then his authority to issue compulsory process for all these documents that Senator Farnese pointed out are a typical byproduct of these types of investigations. There are--there's simply no similar sort out াথ্যার্ক্সমধ্রটন under this bill. And once the Attorney General decides to open an investigation for any reason, the bill provides the Attorney General with significant flexibility--virtually--virtual discretion to seek documents including very sensitive documents that are from any person who may have--who the Attorney General believes may have information that may be relevant to that investigation. In addition, the bill exposes sensitive trade secret proprietary, confidential, commercial and privileged information to disclosure. There's nothing in the bill that acknowledges the ability or the right of a target of a subpoena to assert any privilege

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or to withhold any trade secret information. There's nothing in the bill that provides any mechanism for challenging a subpoena as being beyond the authority of the Attorney General or as violating privilege or as requiring disclosure of trade secrets or In fact, Section 908 of the bill whatnot. appears to contemplate that trade secrets would be disclosed and may be disclosed by the Attorney General in open court. That in itself raises potential takings issues that may require compensation to the owner of the trade secret if trade secret is destroyed by disclosure in open court. There are a couple of protections in the bill, but they're minor. For certain confidential information, I've described the limitations on those protections in the written testimony. My final point is the point that one of the Senators made with respect to the elimination of the statute of limitations with respect to actions brought on behalf of the,Commonwealth. And I have to take off my glasses to read this. The explanation for this is that, as I understand it from the

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Office of the Attorney General, that time doesn't run against the King. Which reminds me of Mel Brooks' statements that it's good to be the King, at least in Pennsylvania. Because the King in federal law doesn't enjoy that protection. The statute of limitations I believe does--correct me if I'm wrong--but I believe the statute of limitations does apply under federal law against the Department of Justice on federal antitrust claims. This provision--and it sounds like you may have made some headway on this one today and found some flexibility in the Attorney General's Office on this. But this provision if left intact would allow claims on behalf of the Commonwealth to survive claims on--with respect to the same conduct under federal law. Claims against any other entity or person in the Commonwealth. And to survive well beyond any period of time that evidence may continue to be available for a fair trial of these claims. So that in a nutshell--and I apologize, I went on a little bit longer than I had intended to.

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57 SENATOR GREENLEAF: That's okay. We want you to have your say and Senator Farnese I believe has some questions. SENATOR FARNESE: Very quickly and I have to run somewhere else. Two issues. First--and I'll go backwards--the ambiguity with the indirect purchaser language in the statute in allowing the potential defenses that are not available under the federal Do you feel that with some additional law. work on the statute at this phase, that could be remedied to be more clear so that it mostly mirrors what is in the federal law? And number two is, the investigation power of the Attorney General. And I think some of your concerns were subjecting businesses or manufacturers to coercion or, you know, increased use of subpoenas to get In Pennsylvania, we have information. something called a rule to file a complaint. Which basically, you know, there is sometimes there's discovery in anticipation of litigation. But at some point, if you're the defendant, you can file a rule and basically force the defendant--the moving

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58 party to file a complaint within a certain time or it's--the claim is thrown out. They're barred. Would not that apply here to sort of protection? I mean, those consumers, if you're going to be in state court, would you not have that protection? And why wouldn't you? MR. DUPREE: Well, let me start with the first question which was about the pass on--I have to roll, so SENATOR FARNESE: you have to--Okay, I'll be very MR. DUPREE: I have actually addressed or tried brief. 14 to address the pass on issue in the written 15 testimony. I don't think, respectfully, the 16 bill can be massaged to address that because 17 you end up with situations, for example, 18 where say a Pennsylvania distributor passes 19 along the full amount of the overcharge to a 20 consumer in another state. Well, then, what 21 happens there in terms of calculating 22 whether or not there's been any damage? How 23 do you account for that in determining 24 whether someone was harmed in Pennsylvania? 25

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And the amount of the overcharge. With respect to the second issue, you're not going to like this answer, I'm just not familiar enough with Pennsylvania Law to be able to say. And I apologize for that. I just don't know enough about Pennsylvania procedure to be---

SENATOR FARNESE: We do have a procedure in Pennsylvania that allows a defendant to basically start the clock running. You file a rule to file a complaint which is some of the protections that are afforded under state law. So we can look at that further, but if you want to, since you don't know about it's--

MR. DUPREE: I apologize for that. But it does occur to me that the flip side of that is, well, with respect to access to information, the Attorney General's Office has already conceded that they do have some abilities under some other state laws to potain access to information. And then, in addition, in multi-state actions, of course, in my experience any way being on the other side of those when the National Association

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60 of Attorneys General put together cases, I know there's extensive information sharing 2 and basically they tend to go with--it 3 seems--with the state law's, discovery under the state laws that are the most aggressive. 5 And .so, they simply go ahead and provide 6 that information to one another. So I'm not 7 convinced that that's a limiting issue. 8 SENATOR FARNESE: Thank you, very 9 much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 10 MR, DUPREE: Thank you. 11 SENATOR GREENLEAF: With regard to 12 the issue that Pennsylvania could bring 13 antitrust claims under the federal antitrust 14 statute which they do now. 15 MR. DUPREE: Yes, sir. 16 SENATOR GREENLEAF: But, there's 17 some limitations, you would admit, to doing 18 that. For example, the subpoena power and 19 other issues that are associated with them 20 hindering them to pursuing the claim fully. 21 MR. DUPREE: Well, I'm not sure I 22 fully agree with that position. I don't 23 think that there are any limitations with 24 respect to, well, let me back up. That's 25

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61 too broad a statement. There are some limitations on bringing actions under federal law. If, in a very rare instance, you had conduct and persons, all of which occurred exclusively in Pennsylvania, then you might have an antitrust claim that fell outside the very broad reach of the commerce clause. And that might fall out of--outside of the federal antitrust laws. I'm not sure that that's a limitation. Because I didn't hear that as being a problem in anything that the Attorney General's Office said. Secondly, the limitation that we've discussed at length here admittedly. indirect purchaser claims. But there's a reason for that limitation. And the reasons, I've already discussed with respect to the Illinois-Brick case. The third is with respect to the issue that you raise with respect to obtaining information. And, you know, I guess the limitation there is the same limitation that -- on one level it's the same limitation that any litigant faces in any court case. You file a lawsuit and you seek discovery. Then, you know, you

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62 develop your case. So, there is, I suppose, some limitation there. But then, there are--as I said in response to Senator Farnesc's question, there are other avenues of obtaining that information that are already available to the Attorney General. Now, I must confess, I don't know all of the powers of the Attorney General. I suspect from especially from hearing them speak that they are very bright and very creative and would come up with numerous ways under their existing authority to obtain information and that there are--from their testimony, it's very clear that at least they have some statutory authority to obtain some of the information. I don't know if that answers your question, but --SENATOR GREENLEAF: Another aspect of that question is that--and we can agree that there is 49 other states that have antitrust state, antitrust legislation laws. MR. DUPREE: You know, I haven't

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done a multi-state survey, that said, I mean it sort of depends upon how you look at some of the states laws. I'm familiar with a

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.1	couple of the states that I'm not sure, I
2	think Wyoming has a law that it's very
3	rudimentary. And I'm not sureit's
4	. definitely not a comprehensive state
б	antitrust law. I think South Carolina has
6	an antiquated trust law. I'm not sure if
7	. they've enacted something more current. So
8	for purposes of discussion, I'm willing to
9	concede the point, but I'm not sure that
10	that's entirely accurate.
11	SENATOR GREENLEAF: But at least the
12	vast majority of them.
13	MR. DUPREE: Yes, that's true.
14	That's true.
15	SENATOR GREENLEAF: Okay and in
16	Kansas, the State of Kansas has antitrust
17	law?
18	MR. DUPREE: Yep, you bet, uh-huh.
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21	I'm sure you don't know the aepects of every
22	state statute. But maybe Kansas, they have
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· 25	to situations where the Attorney General has

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64 reason to believe that an antitrust violation has occurred. And then, once that reason to believe has been established, then there are--there's the opportunity to seek information that's relevant to the scope of that investigation. I don't remember the exact language. SENATOR GREENLEAF: But they do have the right to have the subpoena power. MR. DUPREE: They have the right to subpoena power. They also have pretty significant protections to try to protect the targets of that subpoena power. SENATOR GREENLEAF: That gets to another question, but before--well, 15 let's--okay, let me ask you this one then 16 we'll go back to the other one. 17 MR. DUPREE: Fair enough. 18 SENATOR GREENLEAF: The protection, 19 is there, there's a procedure to suppress or 20 quash a subpoena? Isn't that a normal 21 proceedings that you can bring to quash a 22 subpoena? 23 MR. DUPREE: That's a good question 24 and I don't know the status of that under 25

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Pennsylvania Law and I apologize. I do know that one basis that is often asserted for quashing an investigative subpoena is that it exceeds the authority of the Attorney with the selected ation is that there are no " Indtations" on that authority. So, there's virtually no basis for trying to quash a subpoena. At least on that basis. And I'm not clear based on the way the statute is worded whether there would be a basis for quashing a subpoena that sought trade secrets or privileged information. Because it's very broad in terms of, I believe it's 908 B in terms of the Attorney General's ability to use trade secrets or other highly confidential information.

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SENATOR GREENLEAF: Well, in the procedures to quash, you can raise those issues and set forth what your grounds are for quashing it. And if they've exceeded their authority. Or they've done some other activity or been vexatious in their pursuit of their cause or numerous other things a genius attorney such as yourself could come

up with. Maybe you've even done that. Have you ever filed a petition to quash the subpoena?

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MR. DUPREE: You bet. You bet. And I can tell you it's very difficult to quash investigative subpoenas.

SENATOR GREENLEAF: Have you been successful?

MR. DUPREE: Trying to think. I've been successful in limiting the scope, but I don't recall a situation where I've successfully outright quashed an investigative subpoena.

SENATOR GREENLEAF: Well, that's an extreme victory, I guess, or accomplishment I guess to quash a subpoena.

MR. DUPREE: Well, it is. And I keep in mind in those instances again the Attorney General or the Federal Trade Commission which also has civil and investigative power, civil and investigative demand power, they're--the scope of their authority is limited by statute. In other words, they have to establish a reason to believe or they have to find a reason to

believe that an antitrust violation has occurred. And so you actually--in taking the hypothetical that you've presented in bringing a motion to quash a subpoena based on exceeding one's authority, well, you have to say what that authority is in the first instance. There's nothing in this bill that does so. So you'd be left without even a figuleation the garden of Eden, I'm afraid.

SENATOR GREENLEAF: Well, you could argue that then opens the door even more by saying they're not authorized then too.

MR. DUPREE: Well, but isn't it the function--wouldn't it be better to provide guidance to the Commonwealth Courts with their very limited resources as Senator Farnese pointed out to let them know what is authorized here. I mean, it seems to me that if I'm a Judge in a Commonwealth Court and I get this investigative subpoena and a motion to quash an investigative subpoena, well, if I don't find anything in the legislation, I'm not going to want to deal at length with it because my resources are limited anyway. And I'm sure not going to

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want to parse a room full of documents or come up with some sort of in camera review process to decide what's in and what's out. So the natural inclination--and it's the human response to that kind of a situation . would be to simply let the thing go. In other words, to have standardless or essentially standardless subpoena power.

SENATOR GREENLEAF: I don't disagree with you on that, I'm just questioning you about the general principle of it.

MR. DUPREE: Sure.

SENATOR GREENLEAF: And, in fact, of all parties here, we do intend to follow up after this hearing and to review all the comments and then to reach out to the parties to see what we can do to develop issues that are valid concerns and to address them through the legislation and amendment process. (Inaudible 76:00) things I suppose that could also limit the--going back to the issue about the Pennsylvania can enforce their antitrust laws under federal antitrust statues, that the U.S. Attorney would have--they would have the right to

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69 decide not to bring a case for a variety of 1 reasons. Such as, let's say it doesn't meet 2 their threshold as far as a breadth. And 3 they're looking--or all types of things that 4 they could determine not to bring it, 5 although there may a very valid question or 6 case that the State Attorney General's 7 Office would like to pursue because they 8 have a particular interest in this. 9 MR. DUPREE: And under those 10 circumstances, I believe the State Attorney 11 General could simply bring its own lawsuit 12 under the federal antitrust laws. " 13 SENATOR GREENLEAF: Under the 14 federal--15 MR. DUPREE: Under the federal 16 antitrust laws. 17 SENATOR GREENLEAF: But then, they 18 have the same problems they have before 19 about subpoenas and all the rest of the--20 MR. DUPREE: Once they file suit, 21 they!ve got all the other subpoena powers of 22 any other litigant. 23 SENATOR GREENLEAF: But the issue 24 25 was--

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1	MR. DUPREE: I'm.sorry.
2	SENATOR GREENLEAF: I guess what I'm
3	asking is the fact that there are times when
4	they may want to bring an action themselves
Б	under their own statute thatand the
6	Federal Attorney General opts out to do it
7	and they would have some difficulty there.
8	Senator Vulakovich?
9	SENATOR VULAKOVICH: Thank you, Mr.
10	Chairman. In line with the questioning on a
11	subpoena.
12	MR. DUPREE: Yes, sir.
13	SENATOR VULAKOVICH: I guess it's
14	kind of broad, you're suggesting as far as
15	it's almost like you could subpoena anybody.
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19	suspicion that there's something that may be
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22	of why you suspect that they have something
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25	believe that's the minimumreally, the

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1	· minimum protection that any of these
2	. investigative state statutes provides. And
3	everything the protections then tend to be
4	layered on top of that in my experience.
5	SENATOR VULAKOVICH: And as far as
6	Kansas City, the State of Kansas goes with
7	their antitrust law, do you have an opinion
8	on that as far as, is that too far? Or?
9	MR. DUPREE: Well, I mean, just like
10	the Attorney General's Office would like to
11	have a law that favors it in Pennsylvania, I
12	guess when I defend cases on behalf of
13	antitrust defendants, I'd rather have one
14	less statute to defend under. But I think
15	that they've doneI'd have to give that
16	some thought. But you know, I don't
17	havethe statute was recently amended to
18	make itto improve it. Under the statute
19	that existedso, I guess the short answer
20	is that every one of these statutes has
21	issues with them that we'd do well to take a
22	close look at. But, I know that the statute
23	was recently amended just this year to deal
24	with some issues under it. And it is
25	improved. It isn't perfect, but it's

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1	probably a little bit better in terms of
2	providing a more level playing field than
3	what this bill would provide. I don't know
4	if thatthat's probably not a very good
5	answer and I apologize.
6	SENATOR VULAKOVICH: Okay, thank
7	you.
8	MR. DUPREE: You bet.
9	SENATOR GREENLEAF: Thank you so
10	much for being here today and for your
11	information and we look forward to working
12	with you in the future. Thank you.
13	MR. DUPREE: Thank you, I appreciate
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15	SENATOR GREENLEAF: The next witness
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21	to hear what you have to say too. Do you
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25	Beckley and Madden here in Harrisburg and we

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act as general counsel to the Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association. I'm here today to express PMA's opposition to this bill. To echo comments of Mr. Dupree, we think that this is, in effect, a solution searching for a problem. And I'm just going to hit two points. And then, if you have questions, I'll try to address those. The two points--three points. The first point is; the Attorney General has antitrust powers already under the parens patriae. provision of the Hart Rodino Aca: So, the Attorney General can get involved in investigating mergers. The Attorney General, can bring suits in Federal Court under the federal antitrust law. The other two points I want to make is; I want to talk about this subpoena power. Because in our view, that's--you have to understand from a business's perspective, an antitrust suit is a bet the company type litigation. It's wildly expensive. And it really can--it can mean the difference of staying in business and going out of business. And so, businesses take antitrust suits very

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seriously because of the cost of it. This subpoena power that's set up, in our view;" ls just an 'invitation to an แก้มหาสารส exercise of investrigative power in the context of what can be simply a fishing expedition: Now, I want to address, Mr. Senator Farnese's question about Pennsylvania procedure: Couldn't a business who gets targeted use--file a rule against the Attorney General's Office to file a complaint and get the case moving? Well, the answer to that is no. And the reason it's no is, in order for you to be able to rule someone to file a complaint, you have to actually be in court. And the problem is, with this investigative subpoena power, nobody's going to court yet. And so, there's no way to compel this case to get off the dime. So that, the business that is a target of the subpoena could be just the subject of sort of endless requests for But it goes beyond request for documents. documents. Because witnesses can be subpoenaed. So it's really full scale I think Mr. Donahue referred to discovery.

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it as pre-complaint discovery. In the rules, in the Pennsylvania rules, it might be referred to as discovery in aid of pleading. But it's really general discovery is allowed before any lawsuit has been filed. And that's a big change in the way commercial litigation is practiced in the Pennsylvania. And I don't think it's a positive change. And Senator Greenleaf, in response to your questions about the motions to quash and so forth, the bill does provide that the subpoena process is going to be subject to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 234.4 is the rule that gives a defendant or someone with whom--upon whom a subpoena has been served the right to go into court and say, hey, this subpoena's too broad. It's requesting material that is privileged. It either needs to be quashed or there needs to be a protective order or something like that. The problem here is that what court am I going to go to? Okay, because the rules contemplate that when a subpoena is issued, it's because there's already an action pending. So consequently,

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there's a court in which the action is. I know where to go There's a docket number. with my subpoena to try to get the court to say don't issue it. Here, the act provides or the bill provides that the Commonwealth Court would have original jurisdiction of these matters. So, I guess that means if I'm, you know, in Chambersburg or Lancaster or someplace in, you know, in the north central part of the state, Scranton, now I have to go to Harrisburg or I have to go to Philadelphia or to Pittsburgh to go to an original jurisdiction Commonwealth Court . proceeding to get my subpoena heard. The other problem is, in a motion to quash context, is when you have an action pending, you have a context. You have a context for what the subpoena can ask for. Generally, in litigation, you can't ask for something that isn't related to the issues that have been laid out in the complaint. And as the--Mr. Dupree said, there's no context in this statute for the Attorney General's investigative power. There appear to be no limits to it. So, I can tell you from

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experience, if I were a Commonwealth Court Judge or a Common Pleas Judge sitting there looking at this statute, I'm sitting there, saying, well, the statute gives the Attorney General pretty broad investigative powers, so I'm going to allow this material to be produced. So I think there is no effective lamids woh that investigative power. And there's nothing in there that would cause a court to--really to quash a subpoena under maybe the most outlandish--except under maybe the most outlandish circumstances. So, that's a huge concern to the business community, to our members. Another concern is the risk of inconsistent enforcement. www.As yoù, heard Mr. Donahue testify, this bill 🦇 would change federal law, So that means that if I'm a manufacturer of a product that's sold in Pennsylvania, under federal law it's not apper see violation if I tell a retailer what that product has to be sold Under state law, now it would be. So for. what is the law in Pennsylvania? What am I to do as a manufacturer of a product to be sold in Pennsylvania? The same is true for

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the indirect purchaser change. That's a Wchange from federal law. The Supreme Court has said, no, we're not going to allow that in the Illinois-Brick case. Now, the law would be different in Pennsylvania. Again, this is not--the business community does not like uncertainty or inconsistency in the enforcement of state and federal law. And that's what this is going to lead to. I'm going to make one more point before I pause. And that is this, is the Commonwealth Court the right court to have jurisdiction of these matters? These are complex commercial It seems to me that that is not the cases. mission or function of the Commonwealth Court to hear cases like this. Even the commercial cases that are brought against the Commonwealth, breach of contract cases and the like, by and large go to the Board of Claims first. These cases in--at the federal level are heard in courts of general jurisdiction, the district courts. There's really--if there's going to be jurisdiction for this kind of thing, in our judgment, there's no reason why it can't be in the

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Common Pleas Court which is often more convenient to the litigant and bears directly on the cost of the litigation to the litigant. Again, to repeat, in our view, given the panenepatriae powers, given the risks inherent and the investigatory powers being conveyed here, this is just not good for business. You don't hear anybody in the business community clambering for it. And we're certainly opposed to it. And I'll stop now and try to address any questions you might have.

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SENATOR GREENLEAF: Well, thank you for summarizing your comments, and we'd like to have your written comments as well.

MR. BECKLEY: My understanding is they've been turned in.

SENATOR GREENLEAF: So we'll have those of record, the full comments. And also, we should look forward to discussing those issues. I think there's support for the bill that we pointed out, but that's not how we're going to proceed. We're going to proceed with taking everyone's concerns to heart and serious consideration. And then,

if you have some proposals that you can put in writing or written--I mean, you do have it in your testimony, if there's anything else that you want to bring forward and we can see if we can come up with some consensus on those issues that would address some of your concerns and still be an effective bill. So thank you for being here today. Is there any questions? No, thank you, very much. Last witness is Samuel Marshall, President of Pennsylvania Insurance Federation. Mr. Marshall, thank you for being here.

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MR. MARSHALL: I'll be even briefer. Sam Marshall with the Insurance Federation. And what-we want is a carve out because we are already subject to the standards in this bill under the Unfair Insurance Practices Act and the Insurance Holding Company Law. And I appreciate the Attorney General mentioned that they seem to think that Section 910 of the bill gives us that. It doesn't. The better language would be going back 23 years to a bill that Senator Greenleaf had sponsored that had a specific.

exemption for the business of insurance. Our concern is that we not be subject to two different regulators applying identical but two different statutes. Thank you.

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
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MR. GREENLEAF: Thank you, so much, for being here today and for considering our time constraints. Thank you, very much. And also, we have the Pittsburgh Business Group on Health has submitted written testimony that will be made part of the record. And the NFIB has submitted testimony, written testimony which will be part of these proceedings. Thank you all for being here today. Thank you to all the witnesses for your time and we look forward to working with you in the future. The committee is in recess.

(WHEREUPON, the proceedings concluded.)



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Exhibit C



Differences with Comparable Statutory Text - Additions are <u>Underlined</u>, Changes are notated in a footnote and [Bracketed], Subtractions are marked with <u>Strikethrough</u> and [Bracketed]

73 P.S. §§201-1 - 201-9.2

PENNSYLVANIA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW

8201-1. Short title

This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law."

§201-2. Definitions (Compared to Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.2)

As used in this act.

The following words and terms, when used in this chapter, have the following meanings, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:

1. <u>Act-Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (73</u> P.S. §§ 201-1-201-9.3).

2. <u>Advertising—As used in Section 311.2(24), means any marketing</u> communication which conveys an impression of a purported fact whether expressed, implied, omitted or otherwise concealed, which has a capacity or tendency to deceive or mislead any person or person in interest.

3. <u>Article of trade or commerce—any services and any property</u>, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situate.

4. <u>As a result of Cause-in-fact or but-for theory of causation,</u> <u>excluding any requirement under any reliance theory under common law fraud.</u>

5. <u>Ascertainable loss—Any loss which is quantifiable but not</u> speculative.

6. <u>Communication—Every manner or means of disclosure, transfer or exchange, and every disclosure, transfer or exchange of ideas or information, whether orally, by document, or electronically, or whether face to face, by telephone, mail, personal delivery, electronic transmission or otherwise.</u>

7. <u>Deceptive conduct—A method, act or practice which has a capacity</u> or tendency to deceive. 8. Documentary material—means the original or a copy of any book, record, report, memorandum, paper, communication, tabulation, map, chart, photograph, mechanical transcription or other tangible document or recording, wherever situate.

9. <u>Fraudulent conduct—means unfair conduct or any other</u> conduct which has a tendency or capacity to defraud.

10. Internet service provider—means a person who furnishes a service that enables users to access content, information, electronic mail or other services offered over the Internet, and access to proprietary content, information and other services as part of a package of services offered to consumers.

11. <u>Market structure—Of or relating to the interrelationship of sellers</u> and buyers at all levels of distribution of an article of trade or commerce including, but not limited to, manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, wholesalers, retailers and end users.

12. <u>Marketing communication—Any communication which includes</u> any promoting, selling or distributing of an article of trade or commerce.

13. <u>Moneys or property, real or personal—means something of value</u> including, but not limited to, restitution, disgorgement, attorneys' fees, expert fees, investigation and litigation costs, and court costs.

14. Person—means natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, incorporated or unincorporated associations, and any other legal entities.

15. <u>Person in interest—means a person, the Commonwealth, a</u> <u>Commonwealth agency, municipal authority or political subdivision whose right,</u> <u>claim, title or legal share in something was affected by conduct enjoined under the</u> act.

16. <u>Rebate—Partial refund of the cost of an article of trade or</u> commerce to incentivize the sale of that article of trade or commerce.

17. <u>Representing—As used in Section 311.2(24), means any</u> communication which conveys an impression of a purported fact whether expressed, implied, omitted or otherwise concealed, which has a capacity or tendency to deceive or mislead any person or person in interest.

18. <u>Sale</u>—means a transaction that includes selling, buying or engaging in any other similar activity involving any article of trade or commerce.

19. <u>Tangible document or recording—The original or any copy of any</u> designated documents, including, but not limited to, writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, electronically created data and other compilations of data.

Trade and commerce-mean the advertising, offering for sale, sale 20. or distribution, which are classes of transactions without regard to any further limitation or specification as to a person, of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situate, and includes any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this Commonwealth, including any transaction proposed, initiated or engaged by any person regardless of privity within the market structure.

Transaction-Exchange or transfer of any article of trade or 21. commerce.

Unfair conduct-A method, act or practice, without necessarily · 22. having been previously considered unlawful, which violates public policy as established by any statute, the common law or otherwise within at least the penumbra of any common law, statutory or other established concept of unfairness; which is unscrupulous, oppressive or unconscionable; or which causes substantial injury to a victim.

Unfair market trade practices-means any one or more of the following:

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- A contract, combination or conspiracy between two or more (i) persons at different levels of market structure to fix minimum prices for any article of trade or commerce at one or more levels of market structure;
- A contract, combination or conspiracy between two or more (ii) persons at the same level of market structure to fix or otherwise stabilize prices for any article of trade or commerce;
- A contract combination or conspiracy between two or more (iii) porsons at the same level of market structure to allocate marketing territories, to reduce output of any article of trade or commerce or to allocate customers to whom any article of trade or commerce is, has been or will be marketed:
- A contract, combination or conspiracy between two or more (iv) persons to condition or to have the offect of conditioning the sale of one article of trade or commerce upon the purchase of another article of trade or commerce:
- A contract, combination or conspiracy between two or more (v) persons where the sale of an article of trade or commerce is conditioned upon the seller's purchase of any other article of trade or commerce produced or performed by the buyer;
- A contract, combination or conspiracy between two or more (vi) persons at the same or different level of market structure to persuade or to coerce suppliers or customers to refuse to deal with another person;

- (vii) <u>Actual monopolization, in which a person acquires or retains actual</u> monopoly power through competitively unreasonable practices;
- (viii) <u>Attempted monopolization, in which a person not yet in possession</u> of actual monopoly power, purposefully engages in competitively <u>unreasonable practices that create a dangerous probability of</u> <u>monopoly power being achieved;</u>
- (ix) <u>Joint monopolization, in which two or more persons conspire to</u> jointly retain or acquire monopoly power, where actual monopoly power is achieved through competitively unreasonable practices; and
- (x) Incipient conspiracies to monopolize, in which two or more persons not yet in possession of monopoly power, conspire to seize monopoly control of a market but where monopoly power has not yet actually been achieved.

24. Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practicesmean any one or more of the following:

- (xi) Passing off goods or services as those of another;
- (xii) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services;
- (xiii) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection or association with, or certification by, another;
- (iv) Using deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in connection with goods or services;
- (v) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities that they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that he does not have;
- (vi) Representing that goods are original or new if they are deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used or secondhand;
- (vii) Representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another;
- (viii) Disparaging the goods, services or business of another by false or misleading representation of fact;
- (ix) Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as

advertised;

- Advortising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably expectable public demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity;
- (xi) Making false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions;
- (xii) Promising or offering prior to time of sale to pay, credit or allow to any buyer, any compensation or reward for the procurement of a contract for purchase of goods or services with another or others, or for the referral of the name or names of another or others for the purpose of attempting to procure or procuring such a contract of purchase with such other person or persons when such payment, credit, compensation or reward is contingent upon the occurrence of an event subsequent to the time of the signing of a contract to purchase;
- (xiii) Promoting or engaging in any plan by which goods or services are sold to a person for a consideration and upon the further consideration that the purchaser secure or attempt to secure one or more persons likewise to join the said plan; each purchaser to be given the right to secure money, goods or services depending upon the number of persons joining the plan. In addition, promoting or engaging in any plan, commonly known as or similar to the so-called "Chain-Letter Plan" or "Pyramid Club." The terms "Chain-Letter Plan" or "Pyramid Club" mean any scheme for the disposal or distribution of property, services or anything of value whereby a participant pays valuable consideration, in whole or in part, for an opportunity to receive compensation for introducing or attempting to introduce one or more additional persons to participate in the scheme or for the opportunity to receive compensation when a person introduced by the participant introduces a new participant. As used in this subclause the term "consideration" means an investment of cash or the purchase of goods, other property, training or services, but does not include payments made for sales demonstration equipment and materials for use in making sales and not for resale furnished at no profit to any person in the program or to the company or corporation, nor does the term apply to a minimal initial payment of twenty-five dollars (\$25) or less;
- (xiv) Failing to comply with the terms of any written guarantee or warranty given to the buyer at, prior to or after a contract for the purchase of goods or services is made;
- (xv) Knowingly misrepresenting that services, replacements or repairs are needed if they are not needed;

- (xvi) Making repairs, improvements or replacements on tangible, real or personal property, of a nature or quality inferior to or below the standard of that agreed to in writing;
- (xvii) Making solicitations for sales of goods or services over the telephone without first clearly, affirmatively and expressly stating:
 - (A) the identity of the seller;
 - (B) that the purpose of the call is to sell goods or services;
 - (C) the nature of the goods or services; and
 - (D) that no purchase or payment is necessary to be able to win a prize or participate in a prize promotion if a prize promotion is offered. This disclosure must be made before or in conjunction with the description of the prize to the person called. If requested by that person, the telemarketer must disclose the no-purchase/no-payment entry method for the prize promotion;
 - (xviii) Using a contract, form or any other document related to a consumer transaction which contains a confessed judgment clause that waives the consumer's right to assert a legal defense to an action;
 - (xix) Soliciting any order for the sale of goods to be ordered by the buyer through the mails or by telephone unless, at the time of the solicitation, the seller has a reasonable basis to expect that it will be able to ship any ordered merchandise to the buyer:
 - (A) within that time clearly and conspicuously stated in any such solicitation; or
 - (B) if no time is clearly and conspicuously stated, within thirty days after receipt of a properly completed order from the buyer, provided, however, where, at the time the merchandise is ordered, the buyer applies to the seller for credit to pay for the merchandise in whole or in part, the seller shall have fifty days, rather than thirty days, to perform the actions required by this subclause;
 - (xx) Failing to inform the purchaser of a new motor vehicle offered for sale at retail by a motor vehicle dealer of the following:
 - (A) that any rustproofing of the new motor vehicle offered by the motor vehicle dealer is optional;
 - (B) that the new motor vehicle has been rustproofed by the

manufacturer and the nature and extent, if any, of the manufacturer's warranty which is applicable to that rustproofing;

The requirements of this subclause shall not be applicable and a motor vehicle dealer shall have no duty to inform if the motor vehicle dealer rustproofed a new motor vehicle before offering it for sale to that purchaser, provided that the dealer shall inform the purchaser whenever dealer rustproofing has an effect on any manufacturer's warranty applicable to the vehicle. This subclause shall not apply to any new motor vehicle which has been rustproofed by a motor vehicle dealer prior to the effective date of this subclause.

(u) Unfair market trade practices;

(v) Unfair conduct;

(w) Deceptive conduct; and

(xxi) Engaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding.

§201-3. Unlawful acts or practices: exclusions (Compared to Proposed 37 Pa. Code § 311.3)

Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce [as defined by subclauses (i) through (nni) of clause (4) of section 2 of this act and regulations promulgated under section 3.1 of this act]are hereby declared unlawful. The provisions of this act shall not apply to any owner, agent or employee of any radio or television station, or to any owner, publisher, printer, agent or employee of a newspaper or other publication, periodical or circular, who, in good faith and without knowledge of the falsity or deceptive character thereof, publishes, causes to be published or takes part in the publication of such advertisement.

§201-3.1. <u>Regulations</u>

The Attorney General may adopt, after public hearing, such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the enforcement and administration of this act. Such rules and regulations when promulgated pursuant to the act of July 31, 1968 (P.L. 769, No. 240), known as the "Commonwealth Document Law," shall have the force and effect of law.

§201-4. <u>Restraining prohibited acts (Compared to Proposed 37 Pa. Code §</u> 311.4)

Whenever the Attorney General or a District Attorney has reason to believe that any person is using or is about to use any method, act or practice declared by [section 3 of this

act]¹ to be unlawful, and that proceedings would be in the public interest, he may bring an action in the name of the Commonwealth against such person to restrain by temporary or permanent injunction the use of such method, act or practice. The payment of a rebate by any person to a person in interest does not act as a bar to the imposition of a temporary or permanent injunction or the award of any form of monetary relief under this chapter.

§201-4.1. <u>Payment of costs and restitution (Compared to Proposed 37 Pa. Code</u> § 311.5)

Whenever any court issues a permanent injunction to restrain and prevent violations of this act as authorized in [section 4 above]², the court may in its discretion direct that the defendant or defendants restore to any person in interest any moneys or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of any violation of this act, under terms and conditions to be established by the court.

§201-5. <u>Assurance of voluntary compliance (Compared to Proposed 37 Pa.</u> Code § 311.6)

In the administration of this act, the Attorney General may accept an assurance of voluntary compliance with respect to any method, act or practice deemed to be violative of the act from any person who has engaged or was about to engage in such method, act or practice. [Such]³ assurance may include a stipulation for voluntary payment by the alleged violator providing for the restitution by the alleged violator to consumers, of money, property or other things received from them in connection with a violation of this act. Any [such] assurance shall be in writing and be filed with the court. [Such]⁴ assurance of voluntary compliance shall not be considered an admission of violation for any purpose. Matters thus closed may at any time be reopened by the Attorney General for further proceedings in the public interest [pursuant to section 4]⁵.

§201-6. <u>Deleted by amendment. 1976. Nov. 24 P.L. 1166. NO. 260. §1, imd.</u> effective

§201-7. Contracts: effect of rescission

(a) Where goods or services having a sale price of twenty-five dollars (\$25) or more are sold or contracted to be sold to a buyer, as a result of, or in connection with, a contact

¹ § 311.3 (relating to unlawful acts or practices; exclusions)

² § 311.4 (relating to restraining prohibited acts)

³ This

⁴ This

⁵ under § 311.4 (relating to restraining prohibited acts)

with or call on the buyer or resident at his residence either in person or by telephone, that consumer may avoid the contract or sale by notifying, in writing, the seller within three full business days following the day on which the contract or sale was made and by returning or holding available for return to the seller, in its original condition, any merchandise received under the contract or sale. Such notice of rescission shall be effective upon depositing the same in the United States mail or upon other service which gives the seller notice of rescission.

- At the time of the sale or contract the buyer shall be provided with: **(b)**
 - A fully completed receipt or copy of any contract pertaining to such sale, (1) which is in the same language (Spanish, English, etc.) as that principally used in the oral sales presentation, and also in English, and which shows the date of the transaction and contains the name and address of the seller, and in immediate proximity to the space reserved in the contract for the signature of the buyer or on thefront page of the receipt if a contract is not used and in bold face type of a minimum size of ten points, a statement in substantially the following form:

"You, the buyer, may cancel this transaction at any time prior to midnight of the third business day after the date of this transaction. See the attached notice of cancellation form for an explanation of this right."

A completed form in duplicate, captioned "Notice of Cancellation," (2) detachable, which shall be attached to the contract or receipt and easily following and which shall contain in ten-point bold face type the information and statements in the same language (Spanish, English, etc.) as that used in the contract:

Notice of Cancellation

(Enter Date of Transaction)

You may cancel this transaction, without any penalty or obligation, within three business days from the above date.

If you cancel, any property traded in, any payments made by you under the contract or sale, and any negotiable instrument executed by you will be returned within ten business days following receipt by the seller of your cancellation notice, and any security interest arising out of the transaction will be canceled.

If you cancel, you must make available to the seller at your residence in substantially as good condition as when received, any goods delivered to you under this contract or sale; or you may, if you wish, comply with the instructions of the seller regarding the return shipment of the goods at the seller's expense and risk.

If you do make the goods available to the seller and the seller does not pick them up within twenty days of the date of your notice of cancellation, you may retain or dispose of the goods without any further obligation. If you fail to make the goods available to the seller, or if you agree to return the goods to the seller and fail to do so, then you remain liable for performance of all obligations under the contract.

To cancel this transaction, mail or deliver a signed and dated copy of this cancellation notice or any other written notice, or send a telegram, to (name of seller), at (address of seller's place of business) not later than midnight of (date).

I hereby cancel this transaction.

(Dato)

Buyer's Signature

- (c) Before furnishing copies of the "Notice of Cancellation" to the buyer, both copies shall be completed by entering the name of the seller, the address of the seller's place of business, the date of the transaction, and the date, not earlier than the third business day following the date of the transaction, by which the buyer may give notice of cancellation.
- (d) Each buyer shall be informed at the time he signs the contract or purchases the goods or services, of his right to cancel.
- (e) The cancellation period provided for in this section shall not begin to run until buyer has been informed of his right to cancel and has been provided with copies of the "Notice of Cancellation."
- (f) Soller shall not misrepresent in any manner the buyer's right to cancel.
- (g) Any valid notice of cancellation by a buyer shall be honored and within ten business days after the receipt of such notice, sellers shall (i) refund all payments made under the contract or sale; (ii) return any goods or property traded in, in substantially as good condition as when received by the seller; (iii) cancel and return any negotiable instrument executed by the buyer in connection with the contract or sale and take any action necessary or appropriate to terminate promptly any security interest created in the transaction.
- (h) No note or other evidence of indebtedness shall be negotiated, transferred, sold or assigned by the seller to a finance company or other third party prior to midnight of the fifth business day following the day the contract was signed or the goods or services were purchased.
- (i) Seller, shall, within ten business days of receipt of the buyer's notice of cancellation, notify him whether the seller intends to repossess or to abandon any shipped or delivered goods. If seller elects to repossess, he must so within twenty days of the date of buyer's notice of cancellation or forfeit all rights to the delivered goods.

(j.1) (1) Rights afforded under this section may be waived only through the execution of an emergency authorization form:

- (i) where goods or services have a sale price of twenty-five dollars (\$25) or more;
- (ii) are contracted to be sold to a buyer as a result of, or in connection with, a contact made by the buyer to the seller; and
- (iii) the goods or services contracted for are needed to remedy a bona fide emergency on the buyer's residential real property. Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a seller contacted by a buyer as a result of a bona fide emergency from taking any immediate preliminary steps necessary to remedy a clear and immediate danger that may oause death or serious bodily injury to the buyer, the seller or other porsons without having to obtain the emergency authorization form.
- (2) To obtain a waiver under this section, the seller must furnish the buyer with an emergency work authorization form, as well as a written estimate of the goods or the performance of services. This authorization will allow the seller to immediately proceed with the delivery of the goods or the performance of the services necessary to remedy the bona fide emergency.
- (3) The emergency work authorization form provided for in this section shall be:
 - (i) on a proprinted card at least four inches by six inches in size; and
 - (ii) the writing thereon must be in at least ten-point bold face type in the following form:

Emergency Work Authorization

(Enter date of Transaction)

You, the buyer, having initiated the contract for the goods and services of (enter the name of the seller), the seller, for the remediation of a bona fide emergency hereby authorize the seller to immediately proceed with the delivery of goods or the performance of services necessary to remedy the bona fide emergency. By providing the seller with this authorization, you agree to make full payment for the goods or services provided. You agree not to exercise the rights afforded you by the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law to cancel the contract within three business days from the above date.

You, the buyer, attest that the attached estimate is an accurate description of the goods

and services which will be provided by the seller for the correction of the bona fide emergency:

(date)

(Buyer's signature)

- (j.2) Prior to the buyer signing the emergency authorization form, the seller shall provide the buyer with a written estimate of the total cost of the goods or services, including any fee for the service call. The estimate shall be provided prior to the delivery of the goods or the performance of the services necessary to remedy a bona fide emergency. If the cost of the goods or services actually provided exceeds the estimate provided, the seller must obtain further written authorization from the buyer to perform the additional work or service. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit the seller from charging the buyer a fee for a service call for the purpose of determining the cause of and the appropriate remedy of the bona fide emergency, regardless of whether further goods or services are provided. The seller shall immediately disclose to the buyer whether a service call fee shall be charged upon initiation by the buyer of a contract for goods or services for the remediation of a bona fide emergency. The seller may also charge a fee for immediate preliminary steps without having to obtain a written emergency authorization
- (k) As used in this section, merchandise shall not be construed to mean real property.
- The provisions of this section shall not apply to the sale or contract for the sale of goods or services having a sale price of less than twenty-five dollars (\$25).
- (1.1) This section shall not apply, however, to the sale of precious metals, bonds or foreign currency when the value of the items can fluctuate daily.
- (m) A "Notice of Cancellation" which contains the form and content required by rule or regulation of the Federal Trade Commission shall be deemed to be in compliance with the requirements of this section.
- (n) As used in this section, "bona fide emergency" means any condition existing on the buyer's residential real property which renders, or has the capability to render, the residential real property uninhabitable. The term includes, but shall not be limited to, conditions significantly affecting the heating system, electrical system, plumbing system, ventilation system, roof or outer walls of the residential real property.
- (o) As used in this section, "immediate preliminary steps" means only those steps

necessary to climinate a clear and immediate danger that may cause death or serious bodily injury to the buyer, the seller or other persons. The term includes, but shall not be limited to, termination of the carrying of gas, oil or oil product, sewage or water through an underground pipe or the carrying of electric or communication service through an underground conductor, pipe or structure. The term shall not be construed as including any other steps necessary to repair and remedy the bona fide emergency.

Civil penalties (Compared to 37 Pa. Code § 311.7) §201-8

- Any person who violates the terms of an injunction issued under [section 4 of this **(a)** act]⁶ or any of the terms of an assurance of voluntary compliance duly filed in court under [section 5 of this act]7 shall forfeit and pay to the Commonwealth a civil penalty of not more than [five thousand dollars] (\$5,000) for each violation. For the purposes of this section the court issuing an injunction or in which an assurance of voluntary compliance is filed shall retain jurisdiction, and the cause [shall]⁸ be continued; and, in [such]⁹ cases, the Attorney General, or the appropriate District Attorney, acting in the name of the Commonwealth [ef Pennsylvania], may petition for recovery of civil penalties and any other equitable relief deemed needed or proper.
- In any action brought under [section 4 of this act]¹⁰, if the court finds that a person, **(b)** firm or corporation is willfully using or has willfully used a method, act or practice declared unlawful by [section 3 of this act]¹¹, the Attorney General or the appropriate District Attorney, acting in the name of the Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania], may recover, on behalf of the Commonwealth [ef-Pennsylvania], a civil penalty of not exceeding [ene-thousand-dollars] (\$1000) per violation, which civil penalty shall be in addition to other relief which may be granted under [sections 4 and 4.1 of this act]¹². Where the victim of the willful use of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by [section 3 of this act]¹³ is [sixty]¹⁴ years of ago or older, the civil penalty shall not exceed [three thousand dollars] (\$3000) per violation, which penalty [shall]¹⁵ be in addition to other relief which may be granted

⁶ § 311.4 (relating to restraining prohibited acts)

⁷ § 311.6 (rolating to assurances of voluntary

⁸ must

⁹ these

¹⁰ § 311.4

^{11 § 311.3 (}relating to unlawful acts or practices; exclusions)

¹² under this Chapter

¹³ § 311.3

^{14 60}

¹⁵ will

under [sections 2 and 4.1 of this act]¹⁶. <u>A payment of a rebate to a victim of the</u> willful use of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by § 311.3 does not bar an award of a civil penalty.

§201-9 <u>Forfeiture of franchise or right to do business; appointment of</u> receiver (Compared to 37 Pa. Code § 311.8)

Upon petition by the Attorney General, the court having jurisdiction, may, in its discretion, order the dissolution, suspension or forfeiture of the franchise or right to do business of any person, firm or corporation which violates the terms of an injunction issued under [section 4 of this act]¹⁷. In addition, the court may appoint a receiver of the assets of the company.

§201-9.1. Powers of receiver

When a receiver is appointed by the court pursuant to this act, he shall have the power to sue for, collect, receive and take into his possession all the goods and chattels, rights and oredits, moneys, and effects, lands and tenements, books, records, documents, papers, choses in action, bills, notes and property of every description of the person or persons for whom the receiver is appointed, received by means of any practice declared to be illegal and prohibited by this act, including property with which such property has been mingled if it cannot be identified in kind because of such commingling, and to sell, convey, and assign the same and hold and dispose of the proceeds thereof under the direction of the court. Any person who has suffered damages as a result of the use or employment of any unlawful practices and submits proof to the satisfaction of the court that he has in fact been damaged, my participate with general oreditors in the distribution of assets to the extent he has sustained provable losses. The court shall have jurisdiction of all questions arising in such proceedings and may make such orders and judgments therein as may be required.

§201-9.2. Private actions (Compared to 37 Pa. Code § 311.9)

(a) Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or person, as a result of the use or employment by any person of a

¹⁶ this Chapter

¹⁷ under § 311.4 (relating to restraining prohibited acts)

method, act or practice declared unlawful by [section 3 of this act]¹⁸, may bring a private action to recover actual damages or [one hundred dollars] (\$100), whichever is greater. The court may, in its discretion, award up to three times the actual damages sustained, but not less than [one hundred dollars] (\$100), and may provide such additional relief as it deems necessary or proper. The court may award to the plaintiff, in addition to other relief provided in this section, costs and reasonable attorney fees.

- (b) Any permanent injunction, judgment or order of the court made under [section 4 of this act]¹⁹ shall be prima facie evidence in an action brought under [section 9.2]²⁰ of this act that the defendant used or employed acts or practices declared unlawful by [section 3 of this act]²¹.
- (c) <u>A person may not settle and release any claim under the act as part of a class action in any court of competent jurisdiction without first providing notice to and receiving written consent from the Office of Attorney General.</u>
- (d) Except as provided by section 103 of the Commonwealth Attorneys Act (71 P.S. § 732-103), no person has standing to question the authority of the legal representation of the Commonwealth and its citizens where the Office of Attorney General has not granted consent or has transmitted a written revocation of this consent under subsection (c).

§ 311.10. Subpoena power.

(a) The Attorney General shall be authorized to require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any books, accounts, papers, records, documents and files relating to any commercial and trade practices to the extent authorized by section 918 of The Administrative Code of 1929 (71 P.S. § 307-2) as amended by section 204(d) of the Commonwealth Attorneys Act (71 P.S. § 732-204(d)) and conduct private or public hearings; and, for this purpose, the Attorney General or his representative may sign subpoenas, administer oaths or affirmations, examine witnesses and receive evidence during any investigation or public or private hearing. In case of disobedience of any subpoena or the contumacy of any witness appearing before the Attorney General or his representative, the Attorney General or his representative may invoke the aid of the Commonwealth Court or any court of record of the Commonwealth, and this court may thereupon issue an order requiring the person subpoenaed to obey the subpoena or to give evidence or to produce books, accounts, papers, records, documents and files relative to the matter in question, Any failure to obey this order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt thereof

¹⁸ § 311.3 (relating to unlawful acts or practices; exclusions)

¹⁹ § 311.4 (relating to restraining prohibited acts)

²⁰ this section

²¹ § 311.3

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(b) No documentary material produced pursuant to a demand under this section will, unless otherwise ordered by a court for good cause shown, be produced for inspection or copying by, nor will the contents thereof be disclosed to any person other than the authorized employee of the Attorney General without the consent of the person who produced the material: provided, that under these reasonable terms and conditions as the Attorney General shall prescribe, this documentary material will be available for inspection and copying by the person who produced the material or any duly authorized representative of this person. The Attorney General or any attorney designated by him may use this documentary material or copies thereof as he determines necessary in the enforcement of this act, including presentation before any court: provided, that any material which contains trade secrets or other highly confidential matter will not be presented except with the approval of the court in which the action is pending after adequate notice to the person furnishing this material

§ 311.11. Interpretation.

(a) <u>This Chapter will be liberally construed to effectuate its objective of</u> protecting the public of this Commonwealth from fraud and unfair or deceptive business practices.

(b) <u>The catchall provision contained in § 3112(x) (relating to definitions) of the definition</u> of "<u>Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices</u>" will not be restricted by the subsections enumerated before it, Instead, it will be construed as designed to generally cover all unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.

§ 311.12. Waiver of rights.

<u>A waiver of this Chapter by any person prior to or at the time of a commission of a violation of § 311.3 (relating to unlawful acts or practices; exclusions) or any other section of this Chapter is contrary to public policy and is void <u>An attempt by any person to have another waive his rights under this Chapter shall be deemed to be a violation of the act.</u></u>

§201-9.3. Dog Purchaser Protection

- (a) (1) A seller shall provide a purchaser of a dog with a health record for a dog at the time sale. In addition, the seller shall provide to the purchaser a health certificate issued by a veterinarian within twenty-one days prior to the date of sale for the dog or a guarantee of good health issued and signed by the seller. The health record supplied by the seller shall set for the following:
 - (i) The dog's breed. If the breed is unknown or mixed, the health record shall so indicate. If the dog is advertised or represented as registerable, the name and address of the pedigree registry organization where the dam and sire are registered shall be indicated.
 - (ii) The dog's date of birth. If the dog is not advertised as or sold as purebred, registered or registerable, the date of birth may be approximated, if not known by the seller.

- (iii) The dog's sex.
- (iv) The dog's color and markings.
- (v) A list of all vaccinations, if known, administered to the dog, the date and type of vaccinations and the name of the person who administered them; if known, up to the date of sale; a record of any known disease, illness or condition with which the dog is or has been afflicted at the time of sale; and a record of any veterinary treatment or medication received by the dog while in possession of the seller to treat any disease, illness or condition.
- (vi) The date, dosage and type of any parasitical medicine, if known, that was administered to the dog.
- (vii) The name, address and signature of the seller, along with a statement affirming all of the information provided in this subsection is true to the best of the seller's knowledge and belief.

(2) (i) A health certificate issued by a veterinarian shall certify the

- dog sold by the seller to be apparently free of any contagious or infectious illness and apparently free from any defect which is congenital or hereditary and diagnosable with reasonable accuracy and does not appear to be clinically ill from parasitic infestation at the time of the physical examination. The health certificate shall include the name, address and signature of the veterinarian and the date the dog was examined.
- (ii) A guarantee of good health issued by the seller, and dated and signed by the seller and the purchaser on the date of the sale, warranting that the dog being sold is apparently free of and does not exhibit any signs of any contagious or infectious disease, is apparently free from and does not exhibit any signs of any defect which is congenital or hereditary; and does not exhibit any signs of being clinically ill or exhibit any signs of a parasitic infestation on the date of the sale.

The guarantee of good health shall clearly state in bold type:

This guarantee does not warrant that this dog has been examined by a veterinarian. The Purchaser is encouraged to have this dog examined by a veterinarian as soon after purchase as is feasible.

The seller shall also verbally state these facts to the purchaser.

(b) If, within ten days after the date of purchase, a dog purchased from a seller is determined through physical examination, diagnostic tests or necropsy by a veterinarian, to be clinically ill or dies from any contagious or infectious illness or any parasitic illness which renders it unfit for purchase or results in its death, the purchaser may exercise one of the following options:

- (1)Return the dog to the seller for a complete refund of the purchase price, not including the sales tax.
- (2)Return the dog to the seller for a replacement dog of equal value, of the purchaser's choice, providing a replacement dog is available.
- (3)Retain the dog and be entitled to receive reimbursement from the seller for reasonable veterinary fees incurred in curing or attempting to cure the affected dog, subject to the limitation that the seller's liability for reimbursement shall not exceed the purchase price, not including sales tax, of the dog. This clause shall apply only if the purchaser's veterinarian determines the dog's illness can be treated and corrected by procedures that are appropriate and customary. The value of these services is considered reasonable if comparable to the value of similar services rendered by other licensed veterinarians in reasonable proximity to the treating veterinarian. Reimbursement shall not include the costs of the initial examination fee and diagnostic or treatment fees not directly related to the veterinarian's certification that the animal is unfit for purchase pursuant to this section. If, however, the purchaser's veterinarian determines the dog's illness is incurable, only the options in clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection shall apply. For the purposes of this subsection, veterinary finding of intestinal and external parasites shall not be grounds for declaring the dog unfit for purchase unless the dog is clinically ill or dies due to that condition. A dog shall not be found unfit for purchase on account of injury sustained or illness most likely contracted subsequent to the date of sale. If, within thirty days after the date of purchase, a dog purchased from a seller is certified through physical examination, diagnostic tests or necropsy by a veterinarian that the dog has, or died from a defect which is congenital or hereditary and which adversely affects or affected the health of the animal, the purchaser may exercise one of the options as provided in clauses (1), (2) and (3) of this subsection. Remedies available under clauses (1), (2) and (3) of this subsection shall also apply to replacement dogs.
- (c) A veterinarian's certification of illness, congenital or hereditary defects or death shall be necessary for a refund or replacement or to receive reimbursement for veterinary costs if the dog is retained by the Purchaser and treated for illness or congenital or hereditary defect as provided in this

section. The veterinarian's certification shall be supplied at the purchaser's expense. The veterinarian's certification shall state the following information:

- (1) The purchaser's name and address.
- (2) The date the dog was examined.
- (3) The breed and age of the dog.
- (4) (i) That the veterinarian examined the dog.
 - (ii) That the dog has or had an illness as described in subsection (b) of this section, or a defect as described in subsection (b) of this section, which renders it unfit for purchase or which resulted in its death.
 - (iii) The precise findings of the examination, diagnostic tests or necropsy.
- (5) The treatment recommended, if any, and an estimate or the actual cost of the treatment should the purchaser choose to retain the dog and seek

reimbursement for veterinary fees to cure or attempt to cure the dog. (6) The veterinarian's name, address, telephone number and signature.

Within two business days of a veterinary examination which certifies illness, defect or death the purchaser shall notify the seller of the name, address and telephono number of the examining veterinarian. Failure to notify the seller or to carry out the recommended treatment prescribed by the examining veterinarian who made the initial diagnosis until a remedy as provided for in subsection (b) of this section is agreed upon shall result in the purchaser's forfeiture of rights under this section. Subsection (b) of this section shall not apply where a seller who has provided a health certificate issued by a veterinarian, discloses in writing at the time of sale the health problem for which the buyer later seeks to return the dog. Such disclosures shall be signed by both the soller and the purchaser. Where the seller has provided a guarantee of good health, subsection (b) of this section shall apply regardless of whether the seller disclosed the health problem at the time of sale.

- (d) The refund or reimbursement required by this section shall be made by the seller not later than fourteen days following receipt of the veterinarian's certification that the dog is unfit for purchase or has died from a condition defined as unfit for purchase in this section. The certification shall be presented to the seller not later than five days following receipt thereof by the purchaser.
- In the event that the seller wishes to contest a domand for refund, replacement or (0) reimbursement made by purchaser pursuant to this section, the seller shall have the right, within two business days of notification by purchaser of a condition which renders the dog unfit for purchase as required in subsection (b) of this section, to require the purchaser to produce the dog for examination by a licensed veterinarian designated by the seller. The veterinarian's fee for this examination, including any diagnostic test or necropsy shall be paid by the seller. If the dog is incapable of being transported because of being hospitalized, the purchaser's attending veterinarian shall provide all relevant information regarding the case as requested by the seller's veterinarian. Unless the dog is hospitalized, failure to produce the dog within two business days from examination by the purchaser will nullify any obligation to replace, refund or reimburse by the seller. Upon examination, if the purchaser and the seller are unable to reach an agreement which constitutes one of the options set forth in this section within fourteen days following receipt of the dog for the examination, either party may initiate an action in a court of competent jurisdiction.
- (f) (1) Any seller who advertises or otherwise represents that a dog is registered or registerable shall provide the purchaser of the dog with the following information at the time of sale:
 - (i) The breeder's name and address.
 - (ii) The name and registration number of the dam and sire of the purchased dog's litter.
 - (ill) The name and address of the pedigree registry organization where

the dam and sire are registered.

- All documentation necessary to effect the registration of the dog shall be (2) provided by the seller to the owner within one hundred twenty days of the date of sale. The one hundred-twenty-dayperiod may be extended by the seller if the dog is being imported from outside the United States by notifying the purchaser in writing of the reason for the extension and a reasonable estimate of the arrival date of the registration documents.
- If the seller fails to provide this documentation within one hundred twenty (3) days of the date of sale or fails to notify the purchaser of an extension under clause (2) of this subsection, the purchaser may elect one of the following remedies:
 - Return the dog and receive a full refund of the purchase price, not (1) including sales tax.
 - Retain the dog and receive a refund from the seller in an amount (II)equal to fifty per cent of the purchase price.
- The seller may withhold the dog's registration application until the (4) purchaser supplies the seller with a signed veterinarian's certificate stating that the dog has been spayed or neutered, provided that withholding of the application was agreed to in writing by the purchaser at the time of sale. The seller shall provide the registration application within ten days of receiving the veterinarian's certificate if the certificate is supplied beyond the one-hundred-twenty-day period provided for in clause (2) of this subsection.
- A summary of the provisions of this section shall be conspicuously (g) (1)posted in the place of business of persons subject to this section. The Office of Attorney General shall promulgate regulations specifying the contents of the summary which must be posted. In addition, the posted notice shall state that the health record information is available on request.
 - At the time of the sale, the seller shall provide the purchaser with a written (2) notice setting forth the rights provided under this section. The notice shall include the following statement:

This disclosure of rights is a summary of Pennsylvania Law. The actual provisions of the law are in Section 9.3 of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.

(1)

(h)

- The Office of Attorney General shall enforce the provisions of this section.
- In addition to any other penalty under this act, a civil penalty of up to one (2) thousand dollars (\$1,000) on any current licensee shall be levied against any person who violates any provision of this section or any person who

conducts business under this section without proper license to do so. A penalty shall be levied for each violation.

(3) A purchaser shall file a complaint pursuant to this section by reporting it to the Bureau of Consumer Protection of the Office of Attorney General.

(i) As used in this section:

"Seller" means a kennel, pet shop operator or other individual who sells dogs to the public and who owns or operates a kennel or pet shop licensed by the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture or the United State Department of Agriculture. The term shall not include nonprofit kennels as defined under the Act of December 7, 1982 (Pl. 784, No. 225), known as the "Dog Law."

"Unfit for Purchase" means any disease, deformity, injury, physical condition, illness or any defect which is congenital or hereditary and which severely affects the health of the animal or which was manifest, capable of diagnosis or likely to have been contracted on or before the sale and the delivery of the animal to the consumer.

"Veterinarian" means an individual licensed under the laws of this Commonwealth or any other state to practice veterinary medicine and surgery.